The Influence of Disgust on Judgments about Moral Violations by David, Bea
THE INFLUENCE OF DISGUST ON JUDGMENTS  
ABOUT MORAL VIOLATIONS 
 
By 
Bea David 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in  
Psychology 
 
August, 2012 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
Approved by: 
Dr. Bunmi Olatunji, Chair 
Dr. Craig Smith 
Dr. F. Joseph McLaughlin 
Dr. Owen Jones 
	   ii	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I want to start by thanking my academic advisor and chair of my dissertation 
committee, Dr. Bunmi Olatunji, for all his support in my development as a critical 
thinker, experimenter, and writer.  This dissertation would not have been possible without 
his willingness to listen and provide feedback. His pointed questions, often challenging, 
helped further my conceptualizations and consistently improved the quality of my work.  
Like nobody else, he was interested in the details of my research and writing, and I am 
grateful for his constant availability as a mentor throughout this dissertation project and 
my graduate career more broadly.  He taught me how to be a scientist.    
 The members of my committee are invaluable in the creation of this dissertation 
as well, as they have guided and supported me through my major area paper, dissertation 
proposal, and now the dissertation.  Dr. Craig Smith, with whom I initially started my 
graduate training, taught me the importance of letting ideas grow over time and paying 
attention to the details of studies and theories.  His teachings regarding model 
development contributed to my motivation to develop a model myself.  Dr. F. Joseph 
McLaughlin has consistently supported my career development, both as a researcher and 
a clinician, and has encouraged me through the successes and challenges of graduate 
school.  His positive outlook on life has been an inspiration to me.  Dr. Owen Jones has 
provided excellent feedback and raised important questions to improve my research.  His 
support for a grant application, as well as the materials and information he provided from 
his area of expertise (i.e., Law) have been tremendously helpful.  
	   iii	  
 I have been fortunate to work with and mentor various undergraduate students, 
learning from them and with them.  Thank you Andrew Youssef, Lydia Qualls, Lindsay 
Kramer, Emily Abernathy, Amanda Izquierdo, and Valerie Aguilar.  These students 
collected the majority of the data and offered excellent observations as well as interesting 
ideas throughout this research project.  In addition, this research would not have been 
possible without the practical and mental support and flexibility of the entire Emotion 
and Anxiety Research Lab.  I want to specifically thank Tom Armstrong for being a 
major source of support through graduate school, and for his friendship.  I am also 
particularly grateful toward Mimi Zhao, our lab manager, whose reliable nature and 
willingness to help contributed greatly to the successful completion of this research 
project. 
 I could not have completed this dissertation without the never-ending support and 
encouragement from my friends and family.  I want to thank my close friends for 
providing meaningful, enjoyable and relaxing experiences that allowed me to better 
balance my personal and professional life.  My parents have been an ongoing source of 
motivation to me, and I want to thank them specifically for their willingness to have their 
daughter live in another continent to pursue her career goals.  Finally, I want to thank my 
husband, Micah, whose love for and belief in me, as well as his understanding, humor, 
and thoughtful efforts toward me have offered that extra encouragement when I needed it 
the most.  
	   iv	  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................ ii 
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................1 
The Morality of Disgust.........................................................................................3 
II. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING RESEARCH..............................................8 
III. STUDY ONE.  THE ROLE OF DISGUST AND DISCOMFORT IN  
MORAL JUDGMENT: COMPARING TWO NEGATIVE EMOTIONS  
ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAINTY, IN A ONE-PHASE PARADIGM..........12 
 
Method .............................................................................................................12 
Results..............................................................................................................15 
Discussion ........................................................................................................20 
 
IV. STUDY TWO.  DISGUST, DISCOMFORT AND MORAL VIOLATIONS: 
EXAMINING THE INTENSITY HYPOTHESIS FOR PURITY AND  
NON-PURITY VIOLATIONS............................................................................22 
 
Method .............................................................................................................24 
Results..............................................................................................................26 
Discussion ........................................................................................................31 
 
V.  STUDY THREE. FUNCTIONAL OPPOSITES BUT CONCEPTUAL 
EQUALS?  HOW FEELING CLEAN AND DISGUSTING AFFECT 
JUDGMENTS ABOUT MORAL VIOLATIONS ..............................................34 
 
Method .............................................................................................................37 
Results..............................................................................................................38 
Discussion ........................................................................................................46 
	   v	  
VI. GENERAL DISCUSSION ..................................................................................48 
Limitations .......................................................................................................62 
Implications......................................................................................................64 
Conclusions......................................................................................................69 
Appendix 
A. MORAL VIOLATIONS STUDY ONE .......................................................................70 
B. MORAL VIOLATIONS STUDY TWO AND THREE ...............................................71 
C. QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN STUDY ONE, TWO, AND THREE.........................72 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................74 
	   vi	  
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table              Page 
1. Means and Standard Deviations of Reported Disgust, Sadness,  
and Discomfort in Respective Conditions, and Emotion of Most  
Influence on Moral Judgments.................................................................................50 
 
 
	   vii	  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure                Page 
1. Disgust, Negativity and Discomfort ratings in the Disgust,  
Negative and Neutral condition .........................................................................16 
2. Morality Ratings across Levels of Moral Offense.............................................18 
3.  Ratings of Discomfort and Disgust per Condition............................................28 
4. Recommended Punishment per Violation Type per Condition .........................29 
5. Cleanliness, Positivity, Disgust and Negativity ratings per condition ..............41 
6. Recommended Punishment per Condition.........................................................42 
7. Threatened Moral Character after Disgust Induction ........................................54 
8. Superiority associated with Cleanliness in a Moral Character Model...............57 
9. Attention to Moral Character for High DS Individuals .....................................59 
10. Moral Character as Perceived by Self and Others after  
Disgust Induction ...............................................................................................59 
 
11. Moral Character as Perceived by Self and Others for Those  
High in Self-Disgust .........................................................................................60 
 
 
 
 
	   1	  
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine the following moral offenses: Fred urinated on a car door handle, Kim 
stole from the collection plate at church, Peter left his grandmother waiting at the hospital 
for three hours, and Jennifer spray-painted on someone’s favorite jacket.  When reading 
these moral transgressions, various thoughts and feelings are inevitably elicited, which 
may help determine how wrong these violations are and how much punishment is 
deserved.  Traditionally, moral decisions were believed to result from careful conscious 
considerations of the expected harm or utility of a transgression (i.e., consequentialist 
model; e.g., Bentham, 1781/1988) or the intentions of the transgressor (i.e., deontological 
model; e.g., Kant, 1986/1785).  Such considerations, according to deontological or 
consequential models, ought to cause emotions, secondary to conscious reasoning.  Until 
recently, moral judgment about another person’s actions was thought to result from 
conscious, deliberate considerations regarding relevant moral principles such as fairness, 
care, and respect, as well as intentionality of the actors and severity of the actions (e.g., 
Kant, 1986; Kohlberg, 1984).  However, people often reach moral judgments outside of 
conscious awareness, challenging the central role of reasoning in moral decision-making.   
Evidence that reasoning may not be central in moral decision-making comes from 
research showing that moral judgments occur automatically (Lou et al., 2006) and when 
cognitive resources are unavailable (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, Cohen, 
2008).  People often reach strong moral judgments without being able to explain why 
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they made such judgments (i.e., “moral dumbfounding”; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 
2006; Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000), and even preverbal (pre-reasoning) children, 
as young as 6 months old, have been found to make moral judgments (Hamlin, Wynn, & 
Bloom, 2007).  These findings suggest that conscious reasoning is not required for 
attaining moral judgments and that other factors may be more influential in this process.  
Consistent with this thinking, the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2007) posits that 
exposure to moral transgressions elicits an automatic “flash” of moral intuitions, or basic 
good-bad evaluations of the transgression or transgressors.  These flashes are thought to 
result in immediate moral judgments, without going through careful deliberations of right 
and wrong (although reasoning can at times alter moral intuitions secondarily).  However, 
the extent to which careful reasoning or automated affect is employed may be context 
dependent.  For example, the Dual-Process Theory (Greene, 2007) proposes that the 
degree to which emotions versus reasoning cause moral decisions depends on the 
transgression itself.  If the transgression is up-close and personal, people are more likely 
to base their moral judgment on emotions than if the transgression is impersonal.  
Emotions (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) have been proposed as primary 
determinants of moral judgment, and the notion of “affective primacy”, where an 
immediate good-bad evaluation of a person or action is thought to determine moral 
judgment (Haidt, 2007), has received support from various sources.  While the influence 
of emotions can at times be altered via conscious reasoning (Haidt, 2001), emotions are 
thought to be elicited prior to reasoning and therefore hypothesized to have a greater 
influence on moral judgments than reasoning (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008).  
This association between morality and emotions has been demonstrated in neuroscience 
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research, where moral behavior (e.g., acting fairly) was found in association with 
emotion-related brain activity in the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) and the anterior insula 
(Rilling et al., 2007; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003).  Also, 
individuals with impairments in brain structures thought to be necessary to integrate 
emotions into decision-making (e.g., patients with ventro-medial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC) damage; psychopaths) have shown difficulties reaching typical moral 
judgments (Blair, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007).  Indeed, while most individuals consider 
utilitarian judgments appropriate when the situation is impersonal (e.g., pulling a lever to 
direct a train away from a track with four workers to a track with one worker) but not 
when it is personal and close (e.g., pushing someone onto a train track to stop a train and 
keep it from killing four workers), judgments of patients with damage to the VMPFC and 
psychopaths are unaffected by emotion and are utilitarian in both cases.  These findings 
suggest that emotions play a crucial role in informing, and potentially causing, moral 
decisions. Although the majority of the evidence for this notion has focused on the 
primacy of elementary good-bad evaluations, researchers have begun to examine the role 
of specific emotions in moral decision-making.  
 
The Morality of Disgust 
Disgust is considered particularly informative in guiding moral decision-making 
(e.g., Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000) and has recently received much attention in the 
research literature (e.g., Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Moretti & di 
Pellegrino, 2010; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).  Although 
disgust is traditionally viewed as a disease avoidance mechanism aimed at preventing 
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oral incorporation of contaminated substances (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009), it is 
also thought to regulate moral behavior (e.g., Looy, 2004; Miller, 1997; Schnall, Haidt, et 
al., 2008) and functions as an immorality-avoidance mechanism by signaling that objects, 
behaviors, or persons are to be avoided in order to maintain “purity.”  Labeling a 
behavior as “disgusting” typically leads to a reduction in its occurrence (e.g., smoking; 
Rozin & Singh, 1999) as people work hard to prevent being considered disgusting, and 
risk being rejected from their ingroup (Kahan, 1998).  
People who are prone to experiencing disgust (i.e., people high in disgust 
sensitivity, DS; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994), tend to make more severe moral 
judgments and this effect has been observed in response to homosexuality (Inbar, Pizarro, 
Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Olatunji, 2008), the use of animals in research (Herzog & 
Golden, 2009), criminal offenses (Jones & Fitness, 2008) and violations of purity 
(Horberg et al., 2009).  The mechanism(s) by which a proneness to experience disgust 
may affect moral judgments however, remain unclear.  Those prone to experience disgust 
(i.e., high in DS) experience this emotion more frequently and intensely, which may 
render disgust the primary emotion available when these individuals are asked to judge a 
moral offense.  According to the affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) 
people often determine what they think about a given situation by asking themselves how 
they feel about it.  With disgust being available more readily, high DS individuals may 
consider this emotion as relevant to moral violations (“I feel disgusted, so this situation 
must be bad!”), resulting in more severe moral judgments.  It is noteworthy that this 
feeling of disgust can influence judgments whether it is caused by the situation to be 
judged (Haidt, et al., 2000) (e.g., “Hearing about a brother and sister having sex makes 
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me feel disgusted”) or by other disgust cues that may be irrelevant to the violation 
(Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008) (e.g., unpleasant smell in the room, facial malformation of 
transgressor).   
High DS individuals are also more “morally hypervigilant” than those low in DS 
(Jones & Fitness, 2008), and are thus more actively looking for signs of moral deviance.  
It is well documented that disgust functions to protect from contamination (e.g., Rozin, et 
al., 2000).  Accordingly, feelings of disgust may motivate detection and avoidance of 
various sources of contamination, including those moral in nature.  Indeed, evolutionary 
theory suggests that moral disgust motivates avoidance of relationships with moral norm 
violators due to their costly nature (e.g., being betrayed, harmed, stolen from) (Tyber, 
Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009).   A recent study found that trait disgust predicted 
recommended punishment of purity violations (e.g., keeping a dirty living space) as well 
as reward of virtues (e.g., meditating), implicating the unique role of disgust in moral 
judgments regarding purity (Horberg et al., 2009).  Under conditions of ambiguity (e.g., 
uncertain culpability) those high in DS tend to assume guilt of suspects and recommend 
harsh punishments (Jones & Fitness, 2008) to maximize distance between themselves and 
potential moral offenders, thereby minimizing the risk of contact.  DS may thus be 
associated with harsher moral judgments because these individuals’ threshold for 
detecting immorality is lower.   
The available correlational evidence demonstrates a significant association 
between disgust and morality (e.g., Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997; Rozin & Singh, 
1999; Stein & Nemeroff, 1995).  However, causal claims about the role of disgust in 
moral judgment require experimental manipulation of disgust induction and its influence 
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on moral decision-making.  To date, a few such studies have been conducted.  For 
example, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) induced disgust in participants by first teaching 
them to feel disgusted upon exposure to a given (neutral) word, via hypnosis, and later 
embedding this word in descriptions of moral transgressions.  Participants found 
transgressions containing this word more disgusting and more morally wrong than 
transgressions that did not contain this word.  In a subsequent study, Schnall, Haidt and 
colleagues (2008) induced disgust via an unpleasant odor, a movie clip, a dirty work 
environment, or a writing task, and found that, for those sensitive to internal sensations 
(i.e., those with high private body consciousness; Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981), 
induced disgust, compared to neutral affect, led to more severe judgments of morally-
relevant behaviors (Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008).  Lastly Eskine and colleagues (2011) 
recently found that a bitter and disgusting taste in participants’ mouth resulted in more 
severe moral judgments than a sweet or neutral taste (Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz, 2011).  
 The few available experimental findings provide initial support for the view that 
experiencing disgust results in more severe moral judgment.  However, a major 
conceptual limitation of these studies, comparing disgust induction to neutral affect 
induction, is that they leave open the possibility that the documented influence of disgust 
on moral judgments is mainly one of negative affect, not the emotion of disgust 
specifically.  In response to such concerns, three recent studies have compared disgust 
with sadness, and some support for the specificity of disgust in moral judgments has been 
observed.  For example, Schnall, Haidt and colleagues (2008) found that disgust priming 
via a movie clip, led to more severe moral judgments than did sadness priming for 
participants sensitive to internal bodily sensations.  Similarly, Horberg and colleagues 
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(2009) found that participants who had been primed with disgust via a movie clip, 
compared to those primed with a sadness clip, reported more perceived moral wrongness 
and rightness of purity violations (e.g., being sexually promiscuous) and virtues (e.g., 
maintaining a healthy body), respectively.  In a recent study by Moretti and di Pellegrino 
(2010) participants were primed with disgust, sadness, or neutral affect (via exposure to 
images) prior to participation in an Ultimatum Game.  People responded more strongly to 
unfairness in the Ultimatum Game after disgust priming than after sadness or neutral 
affect priming.  From these findings, the authors concluded that disgust is indeed 
uniquely associated with morality and distinct from other emotions in its influence on 
morally relevant decision-making. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING RESEARCH 
 
Although important advances have been made in the literature delineating the 
unique role of disgust in moral judgments (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009; Moretti & di 
Pellegrino, 2010; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008), several limitations of this line of research 
need to be addressed and alternative interpretations of the existing data considered.  First, 
the observed greater moral severity following disgust induction (compared to neutral 
affect induction), but not following sadness induction (Horberg et al., 2009; Moretti & di 
Pellegrino, 2010; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008) may be caused by characteristics of disgust 
and sadness that are irrelevant to making moral judgments.  Disgust has been identified 
as a “sticky” emotion (Olatunji, Forsyth, & Cherian, 2007), more resistant to extinction 
than other emotions.  This feature of disgust may render it particularly influential in 
paradigms where emotions are induced first (phase one), and their influence on moral 
judgments is measured later (phase two).  Sadness, as a comparison emotion, may have 
failed to affect moral judgments in prior research (Horberg et al., 2009; Moretti & di 
Pellegrino, 2010) because it dissipated before participants actually made moral 
judgments.  The dissipation disparity between more sticky disgust and the potentially 
more quickly extinguished sadness may explain the uniquely influence of disgust on 
judgments about moral violations.  
Alternatively, sadness and disgust may dissipate at an equal rate, but sadness may 
influence moral judgments less so than disgust due to their differential 
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appraisals (i.e., sense of certainty about what is happening and what will happen next; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  This difference may explain why disgust is more likely to 
affect any judgments, but not moral judgment specifically.  While disgust is characterized 
by a sense of certainty about the situation and what will happen next (Tiedens & Linton, 
2001), sadness is more closely associated with uncertainty (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
Feeling certain is thought to indicate accuracy of one’s beliefs and judgments, and may 
limit the need for further, more careful deliberation of a situation (Mackie & Worth, 
1989).  Certainty appraisals have been found to increase reliance on heuristics (i.e., quick 
rules of thumb, stereotypes, emotions) (e.g., Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Tiedens 
& Linton, 2001), especially when the situation bears little personal relevance, or the 
person judging it has little motivation to engage in careful processing or to reach a 
specific conclusion (Forgas, 1995; Tetlock, 1985).   
The moral judgments made in most published studies typically have low personal 
relevance, and no experimental manipulations to encourage careful processing (e.g., 
accountability manipulations, Lerner et al., 1998) are employed, allowing a greater 
influence of disgust and its associated sense of certainty.  Careful, deliberate and 
systematic processing of situations to be judged has been found to reduce the influence of 
extraneous emotions, stereotypes, or other heuristics in decision-making (Bodenhausen, 
Gabriel, & Lineberger, 2000).  Emotions that trigger this type of processing (e.g., 
sadness, hope; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) may be especially unlikely to influence 
judgments, in particular when these emotions are unrelated to the situation to be judged.  
Disgust may thus influence moral judgments more strongly than sadness due to the 
difference in certainty appraisals associated with each emotion.  Accordingly, it may be 
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premature to conclude that disgust is uniquely predictive of moral judgments as other 
negative emotions that are characterized by certainty appraisals and associated systematic 
processing tendencies may play a similar role (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).   
By comparing disgust with other negative emotions, more specific claims about 
its unique role in moral judgments can be made.  Affect elicited during hand submersion 
in ice water may be an opportune comparison to disgust in the context of making moral 
judgments.  Hand submersion in ice water, also known as the “cold pressor task”, has 
been widely used as a method to examine how pain and discomfort influence cognitive 
processes such as judgment, punishment (Berkowitz, 1993), and attention (Eccleston & 
Crombez, 1999).  Prior research suggests that pain demands attention and thereby 
interrupts deliberate cognitive processes (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).  Such 
interruption of normal cognitive processing is typically associated with increased reliance 
on heuristics and affect-driven, automatic processing (Greene et al., 2008).  Inducing 
discomfort may therefore be a well-suited comparison affect to examine the unique role 
of disgust on moral judgments.  Although discomfort is not a basic emotion (e.g., disgust 
or sadness), it consists of sensory and affective components (Price, 2000).  Furthermore, 
discomfort is negative in its experienced valence, making it appropriate to compare to 
disgust in relation to influencing moral judgments.  
The first study of this investigation aimed to explore whether disgust is uniquely 
informative of moral judgments by comparing the influence of disgust on moral 
judgments to that of discomfort.  To eliminate possible dissipation disparity as an 
explanation for differences between disgust and discomfort, moral judgments where 
made during the affect induction (i.e., in a one-phase paradigm). Consistent with prior 
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research indicating a unique role for disgust in moral decision-making, it was predicted 
that ratings of immorality regarding moral transgressions would be higher during disgust 
induction than during discomfort induction and a neutral affect control condition. 
However, if the increased severity of moral judgments associated with disgust is an 
artifact of the negative valence associated with disgust, then ratings of immorality in the 
discomfort and disgust condition are expected to be significantly higher than those in the 
neutral condition, but not differ significantly from one another.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
STUDY ONE.  THE ROLE OF DISGUST AND DISCOMFORT IN MORAL 
JUDGMENT: COMPARING TWO NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH 
CERTAINTY, IN A ONE-PHASE PARADIGM 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Seventy-seven undergraduate students (N = 77, 82% female, 69% Caucasian) 
participated in exchange for course credit. 
 
Materials 
Moral Transgressions.  Twelve one-sentence descriptions of three levels of moral 
transgression (non-offenses, moderate offenses, severe offenses) were presented to 
participants in random order (See Appendix A).  Non-offenses (N = 4) described 
behavior that is not morally wrong (e.g., F.W. went for a walk in the park).  Moderate 
offenses (N = 4) described behavior that is morally questionable, but not extremely 
immoral (e.g., K. D. lied to a good friend).  Severe offenses (N = 4) described extreme 
wrongdoings (e.g., G.S. murdered two people in their own home).  These 12 offenses 
were selected from a larger pool of offenses on the basis of pilot data.  
Affect Induction.  Affect was induced via submersion of the participants’ left 
hand, in a thin plastic glove, into one of three liquids (imitation vomit, ice water, or 
lukewarm water, depending on the condition they were randomly assigned to) while 
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rating each of the 12 moral transgressions.  The imitation vomit in the disgust condition 
consisted of cream of mushroom soup, cream of chicken soup, black beans, and chopped-
up pieces of fried gluten.  This recipe was partially based on a recipe for imitation vomit 
developed by Tsao and McKay (2004).  The ice water in the discomfort condition 
measured 50 degrees, and this temperature was kept constant by adding ice cubes to the 
water throughout the experiment.  Finally, participants in the neutral condition were 
asked to place their hand in lukewarm water (80 degrees).  All liquids were kept in white, 
four-gallon containers.  
Ratings.  Participants were asked to rate how morally wrong they found each 
transgression on a scale from 0 (not morally wrong at all) to 7 (extremely morally 
wrong).  They were also asked to indicate how disgusting they found each of the 
transgressions, on a scale from 0 (not at all disgusting) to 7 (extremely disgusting). 
Finally, participants were asked to rate how much punishment they thought each 
transgression deserved on a scale from 0 (not at all deserving of punishment) to 7 
(extremely deserving of punishment).  
Questionnaires.  The Disgust Sensitivity Scale-Revised (DS-R; Haidt et al., 1994, 
modified by Olatunji, Williams, et al., 2007) is a 25-item scale that measures disgust 
sensitivity across domains of core, animal reminder, and contamination disgust. 
Participants are asked to indicate to what extent they agree with statements like “It 
bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full of mucous” on a 5-point scale, ranging 
from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), and they are also asked to indicate how 
disgusting they find things such as “You see a man with his intestines exposed after an 
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accident” on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not disgusting at all) to 4 (extremely 
disgusting).  The DS-R had an alpha coefficient of .84 in the present study.  
For the Negative Affect component (alpha = .80) of the Positive and Negative 
Affectivity Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) participants are asked to 
indicate how they typically feel, in terms of 10 negative (e.g., “hostile”) emotions, and 
they rate these items on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) 
to 5 (extremely).  
 
Procedure 
After completing the DS-R and the NA of the PANAS, participants were 
randomized to one of three affect inductions.  In the disgust condition, participants placed 
their hand in a glove and then in a container filled with imitation vomit.  Participants 
were asked to hold their hand in the vomit while making their ratings of disgust, 
immorality and punishment for each moral transgression. After rating a given 
transgression, participants removed the glove from their hand, discarded it, and put on a 
new glove, to prevent habituation.  In the discomfort condition, participants placed their 
hand in a glove and then in a container filled with ice water, while making their ratings. 
Immediately following completion of the ratings for a given transgression, participants 
placed their hand in a container with lukewarm water (80 degrees) for two minutes, to 
raise their hand temperature, before submerging it in ice water again to rate the next 
transgression.  In the neutral condition, participants placed their hand in a glove, and then 
in lukewarm water, while rating the moral transgressions.  After rating a given 
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transgression, participants removed the glove from their hand, discarded it, and put on a 
new glove.  
For all participants, the time between finishing ratings for one transgression and 
starting ratings for the next transgression was two minutes.  This time allowed for raising 
hand temperature (in the discomfort condition) and helped prevent carry-over effects 
from one transgression to the next.  After all 12 transgressions were rated, participants 
indicated how negative and disgusted their task (submerging the hand in liquid) made 
them feel, as well as how much discomfort they experienced during this task on a scale 
from 0 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).  
 
Results 
 
Affect Induction Manipulation Check 
A 3 (condition: disgust, discomfort, neutral) X 3 (emotion rating: disgust, 
negativity, discomfort) mixed-factor ANOVA yielded significant main effects of 
condition [F(2, 74) = 14.34, p < .001] and emotion rating [F(2, 148) = 13.31, p < .001]. 
These main effects were qualified by a significant condition by emotion rating [F(2, 148) 
= 12.90, p < .001] interaction.  Disgust, discomfort and negativity ratings were then 
entered in a multivariate ANOVA with condition as the independent variable, revealing a 
main effect of condition for disgust [F(2, 74) = 17.58, p < .001], discomfort [F(2, 74) = 
16.69, p < .001] and negativity [F(2, 74) = 8.47, p < .001].  Pairwise follow-up 
comparisons of the conditions (disgust, discomfort, neutral) for disgust, negativity and 
discomfort revealed that, as predicted, participants reported significantly more disgust in 
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the disgust condition (M = 2.96 SD = 1.87) than in the discomfort condition (M = 1.28, 
SD = 1.60, p < .001) or in the neutral condition (M = 0.54, SD = .91, p < .001), and the 
latter two did not significantly differ (see Figure 1).  Furthermore, participants reported 
significantly more discomfort in the discomfort condition (M = 3.56, SD = 1.78) than in 
the disgust condition (M = 2.54, SD = 1.77, p < .001) and in the neutral condition (M = 
1.08, SD = .94, p < .001).  They also reported more discomfort in the disgust than in the 
neutral condition (p = .021).  Negativity did not differ in the disgust and discomfort 
conditions (see Figure 1) while participants reported more negativity in the disgust (M = 
2.35 SD = 1.70) and discomfort (M = 2.44, SD = 1.92) conditions than in the neutral 
condition (M = 0.77, SD = 1.24, pdisgust-neutral < .001, pnegative-neutral < .001).  
 
 
Figure 1. Disgust, Negativity and Discomfort ratings in the Disgust, Negative and 
Neutral condition (Note: *** p < .001, * p < .05) 
 
0	  
0.5	  
1	  
1.5	  
2	  
2.5	  
3	  
3.5	  
4	  
discomfort	   negativity	   disgust	  
In
te
n
si
ty
	   Neutral	  Condition	  Disgust	  Condition	  Discomfort	  Condition	  
***	  
***	  
***	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  
	   17	  
DS across conditions 
A univariate ANOVA was conducted with condition (disgust, discomfort, neutral) 
as independent variable and DS as dependent variable.  The lack of a main effect of 
condition, F(2, 74) = .848, n.s., indicated that DS was equally distributed across 
conditions.  DS for participants in the disgust condition (M = 56.61, SD = 15.42) did not 
differ from that of participants in the discomfort (M = 61.64, SD = 14.39) or the neutral 
condition (M = 58.92, SD = 11.18).  
 
Affect Induction and Judging Moral Violations  
 Disgust, morality and punishment ratings were then entered in a 3 (condition: 
disgust, discomfort, neutral) X 3 (offense level: non-offense, moderate offense, severe 
offense) mixed-factor ANOVA.   
Morality 
The analysis revealed a main effect of condition for morality, F(2, 74) = 4.67, p = 
.012.  Pairwise comparisons showed that participants made significantly more severe 
moral judgments in the discomfort condition (M = 3.60, SD = .43) than in the neutral 
condition (M = 3.29, SD = .52; p = .003), and marginally more severe moral judgments in 
the discomfort condition than in the disgust condition (M = 3.42, SD = .33; p = .07).  
There were no differences between moral judgments in the disgust condition and the 
neutral condition (see Figure 2).  
A significant main effect of offense level was also found for moral judgments, 
F(2, 148) = 3431.41, p < .001, confirming that the non-offenses used in this study (M = 
0.04, SD = .22) were less morally wrong than the moderate offenses (M = 3.70, SD = .90, 
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p < .001) and the moderate offenses were found to be less immoral than the severe 
offenses (M = 6.74, SD = .24, p < .001).  These main effects of offense level and 
condition were qualified by a significant condition by offense level interaction, F(4, 148) 
= 3.63, p = .008.  Morality ratings for each offense level were then entered in a 
multivariate ANOVA, with condition (neutral, disgust, discomfort) as the independent 
variable, and there was a main effect of condition for moderate offenses only, F(2, 74) = 
4.27, p = .018.  Follow-up pairwise comparisons for moderate offenses showed that 
participants rated transgressions as significantly more morally wrong in the discomfort 
condition (M = 3.98, SD = .93) than in the neutral condition (M = 3.22, SD = 1.12, p = 
.005), and marginally more morally wrong in the discomfort condition than in the disgust 
condition (M = 3.50, SD = .73, p = .07).  No significant differences were found in 
morality ratings of moderate offenses between participants in the disgust and neutral 
condition. 
 
 
Figure 2. Morality Ratings across Levels of Moral Offense (Note: ** p < .01) 
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Disgust 
The 3 (condition: disgust, discomfort, neutral) X 3 (offense level: non-offense, 
moderate offense, severe offense) mixed-factor ANOVA for disgust ratings showed no 
main effect of condition F(2, 74) = 1.42, n.s., or interaction between condition and 
offense level F(4, 148) = 2.06, n.s.  There was a main effect of offense level, F(2, 148) = 
1967.39, p <.001, with severe offenses rated as more disgusting (M = 6.48, SD = 1.12) 
than mild offenses (M = 2.48, SD = 1.12, p < .001) and non-offenses (M = .02, SD = 1.12, 
p < .001), and mild offenses rated as more disgusting than non-offenses (p < .001).   
Punishment 
The 3 (condition: disgust, discomfort, neutral) X 3 (offense level: non-offense, 
moderate offense, severe offense) mixed-factor ANOVA for punishment ratings showed 
no main effect of condition F(2, 74) = 1.62, n.s., or interaction between condition and 
offense level F(4, 148) = 1.27, n.s.  Consistent with expectations, there was a main effect 
of offense level, F(2, 148) = 1932.06, p <.001, with severe offenses rated as deserving 
more punishment (M = 3.55, SD = .61) than mild offenses (M = .36, SD = .28, p < .001) 
and non-offenses (M = .03, SD = .18, p < .001), and mild offenses rated as deserving 
more punishment than non-offenses (p < .001).  
 
DS and Judgment of Moral Violations 
 The role of DS in judgment of moral violations was examined via a linear 
regression with disgust, morality and punishment ratings for non-offenses, moderate 
offenses and severe offenses as outcome variables, and DS as independent variable.  
Results indicated that DS failed to predict how disgusting participants found non-
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violations (B = -.01, n.s.), moderate violations (B = -.07, n.s.), and severe violations (B = 
.09, n.s.). Similarly, DS failed to predict how morally wrong participants found non-
violations (B = .02, n.s.), moderate violations (B = .05, n.s.), and severe violations (B = 
.04, n.s.).  Finally, DS did not predict how deserving of punishment participants found 
non-violations (B = -.03, n.s.), moderate violations (B = .11, n.s.), and severe violations 
(B = -.02, n.s.).  Controlling for Negative Affect (PANAS) did not change this pattern of 
relationships. 
 
Discussion 
Previous research suggests that disgust is particularly informative when making 
moral judgments (e.g., Eskine et al., 2011; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 
2008), and would predict more perceived immorality of moral transgressions when 
disgust, relative to other affective states, is induced.  However, in the present study, the 
most severe judgments of immorality were made in the discomfort condition, differing 
significantly from the neutral condition.  This finding was especially relevant for 
moderate offenses, where morality ratings in the discomfort condition differed 
significantly from those in the neutral condition and marginally from those in the disgust 
condition.  The more pronounced effect of condition on moral judgments of moderate 
offenses may be attributed to floor and ceiling effects for the non-offenses and severe 
offenses, respectively.  When behavior is clearly harmless or clearly wrong, affective 
information may not be needed to reach moral judgments.  Moderate offenses on the 
other hand, can be considered ambiguous with regard to their moral severity.  This 
ambiguity is thought to render decisions about their severity more difficult.  Accordingly, 
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participants may be more susceptible to influences of extraneous emotions in judging 
such offenses (Affect-as-information, Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
The finding that discomfort resulted in more severe judgments than disgust is 
inconsistent with the notion that disgust uniquely influences moral judgment.  One 
explanation for this finding is that the previously documented unique effect of disgust on 
moral judgments was an artifact of the two-phase research paradigms used in prior 
studies (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010).  The current one-phase 
paradigm, where the influence of disgust on moral judgments was compared to that of 
discomfort during affect induction, eliminated the role of the proposed dissipation 
disparity.  Disgust may thus be an informative emotion in moral judgments when there is 
a delay between emotion onset and moral judgment.  Future research comparing effects 
of disgust versus other negative affect on immediate and delayed judgments about moral 
violations could easily test this hypothesis.  Alternatively, discomfort may have 
influenced moral judgments more so than disgust due to the greater intensity with which 
this affective state was induced.  The discomfort induced by hand submersion in ice 
water was more intense than the disgust induced via gloved hand submersion in imitation 
vomit.  Therefore, disgust may not have played a primary role in the current moral 
judgments because it was induced less intensely than discomfort.  This intensity disparity 
limits the ability to differentiate between how disgust versus general negative affect 
influence moral judgments.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
STUDY TWO.  DISGUST, DISCOMFORT AND JUDGMENTS ABOUT MORAL 
VIOLATIONS: EXAMINING THE INTENSITY HYPOTHESIS FOR PURITY AND 
NON-PURITY VIOLATIONS 
 
The findings of study one challenge the unique role of disgust in moral 
judgments, but it would be premature to completely rule out a specific role for disgust 
based on these findings.  Disgust may have a very specific influence once its intensity is 
matched with a comparison emotion.  It may also be the case that disgust affects some 
types of moral violations and not others.  Haidt and Joseph (2004) categorized five moral 
foundations thought to affect judgment of misbehavior.  When deciding whether a 
behavior is right or wrong, people may be influenced by whether someone was harmed 
(Harm/care foundation) or treated unfairly (Fairness/reciprocity foundation), if someone 
was disrespectful of authority (Authority/respect foundation), disloyal (Ingroup/loyalty 
foundation), or physically, mentally or spiritually impure (Purity/sanctity foundation).  
Prior research has shown that disgust is specifically associated with violations of 
Purity/sanctity (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), and disgust priming has been 
found to have an influence on moral judgments about purity violations, but not on 
fairness violations (Horberg et al., 2009).   
A specific effect of disgust on moral judgments about purity violations has not 
been a consistent finding however, as several studies have demonstrated an effect of 
disgust inductions on judgments about moral transgressions unrelated to impurity.  For 
example, levator labii muscle activation (i.e., a core component of the facial expression 
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of disgust) increased when participants experienced violations of fairness (Chapman, 
Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009), and disgust induction increased participants’ self-
reported negative affect in response to unfairness (Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010).  Other 
studies have demonstrated an effect of disgust on violations that are related to impurity as 
well as those unrelated to impurity.  For example, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) found an 
effect of disgust on moral judgments about harm, unfairness, and impurity.  Also, 
Schnall, Haidt and their colleagues (2008) compared how disgust priming influenced 
judgment of purity violations and violations regarding unfairness or harm, and found no 
significant differences.  Finally, in a recent study by Hutcherson and Gross (2011) 
participants reported feeling morally disgusted by violations of fairness, community, 
authority, care, as well as purity.  Based on the current findings it is unclear whether 
disgust uniquely affects purity violations or if it informs judgments about all types of 
moral violations.   
In study two, this question was directly addressed as participants were asked to 
rate both moral violations of purity and those unrelated to purity during a disgust or 
discomfort inductions, matched for intensity, or during a neutral affect induction that 
served as a control condition.  With this design that controls for affect intensity, any 
differences in moral judgments between the disgust and discomfort condition can more 
clearly be attributed to characteristics of disgust and discomfort respectively, as opposed 
to an intensity disparity.  If intensity and negativity are primary factors in determining the 
influence of emotions on judgments about moral violations, no differences were 
anticipated in severity of moral judgments between the disgust and in the discomfort 
condition, while those in both conditions were expected to be more severe than 
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judgments in the neutral condition.  Furthermore, if disgust is particularly informative for 
violations of purity, an interaction was expected between condition and violation type, 
with disgust induction leading to more severe judgments of impure, but not pure 
violations.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Sixty-one undergraduate students (N = 61, 75% female, 72% Caucasian) 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit.   
 
Materials 
Moral Transgressions.  Due to the demonstrated more pronounced effect of affective 
inductions for judgments about moderate moral violations, only moderate violations (N = 
20) were used in study two.  Ten of these violations contained an element of impurity 
(e.g., John urinated on someone’s car door handle), while the other ten did not represent 
impurity (e.g., John lied about how many hours he worked).  These transgressions (see 
Appendix B) were selected on the basis of a pilot studyi.   
Affect Induction.  Affect was induced via submersion of participants’ left hand, 
without the use of a glove, in one of three liquids: imitation vomit at room temperature 
(disgust condition), 50-degree ice water (discomfort condition), or 80-degree lukewarm 
water (neutral condition).  These emotion induction procedures were selected on the basis 
of a pilot studyii.  
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Ratings.  Participants were asked to indicate, on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely) how morally wrong they found each of the 20 transgressions.  Participants 
were also asked to indicate how disgusting they found each transgression on a scale from 
0 (not at all disgusting) to 7 (extremely disgusting), and how deserving of punishment 
they found each transgression on a scale from 0 (not at all deserving of punishment) to 7 
(extremely deserving of punishment). 
Questionnaires.  The Disgust Scale – Revised (DS-R; Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 
1994, modified by Olatunji et al., 2007) and the Negative Affect (NA) component of the 
Positive and Negative Affectivity Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), used 
in study one, were also completed as part of study two.  The internal consistency alphas 
of the DS-R and NA in the current study were .85 and .80, respectively. 
 
Procedure  
Once consent was obtained, participants, randomly assigned to one of the three 
conditions (disgust, discomfort, neutral), completed the DS and the NA of the PANAS.  
Next, participants placed their hand in a container with a specific texture (imitation 
vomit, ice water, or lukewarm water).  Participants observed a prompt on the computer 
screen indicating that it was time to place their hand in the container. Once the hand was 
well submerged, the experimenter pressed a key to proceed to a screen displaying a moral 
violation.  After three seconds, participants were asked to indicate level of disgust, moral 
wrongness and deservingness of punishment in response to the moral violation. These 
three questions were presented in random order, and there was no time limit to respond. 
Once the third question was completed, a message on the computer screen instructed 
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participants to remove their hand from the container.  At this point, the experimenter 
offered a paper towel to dry their hand (neutral condition); asked participants to place 
their hand in a container with warmer water (discomfort condition); or asked participants 
to wash off their hand in a container with lukewarm water, and then dry it with a paper 
towel (disgust condition).  This procedure was employed to offer an activity between 
different ratings (neutral condition), to prevent habituation (disgust and discomfort 
condition), to prevent pain (discomfort condition), and to equate the time between rating 
moral transgressions (set at 1 minute).  Consistent with study one, moral judgments in 
study two were made simultaneously with the affective induction to rule out dissipation 
disparity as a cause for differential findings between disgust and discomfort.  After rating 
all 20 moral violations, participants were asked to indicate to what extent, on a scale from 
0 (not at all) to 7 (extremely so), the hand submersion task made them experience disgust 
and discomfort.  Finally, participants were debriefed and dismissed. 
 
Results 
 
Vignette Manipulation Check 
 To confirm that the purity violations used in the current study were seen as more 
disgusting and equally morally wrong and deserving of punishment than non-purity 
violations, disgust, immorality, and punishment ratings for non-purity and purity 
violations were entered in separate repeated measures analyses.  The analysis for disgust 
ratings showed a significant main effect of purity, F(1, 60) = 276.17, p < .001, with 
purity violations perceived as significantly more disgusting  (M = 5.70, SD = .79) than 
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non-purity violations (M = 2.44, SD = 1.57).  The analysis for morality ratings also 
showed a significant main effect of purity, F(1, 60) = 14.39, p < .001, with non-purity 
violations rated as significantly more immoral  (M = 5.00, SD = .74) than purity 
violations (M = 4.70, SD = .89).  Lastly, punishment ratings did not show a significant 
main effect of purity F(1, 60) = .53, n.s., as non-purity (M = 4.25, SD = .80) and purity 
violations (M = 4.31, SD = .95) were rated as equally deserving of punishment.  
 
 Affect Induction Manipulation Check 
 To confirm that exposure to imitation vomit without a glove induced disgust to 
the same degree as ice water did discomfort, final disgust and discomfort ratings were 
entered in a 2 (rating: disgust, discomfort) X 3 (condition: disgust, discomfort, neutral) 
mixed-model ANOVA.  This revealed a significant rating by condition interaction F(4, 
116) = 5.66, p < .001.  A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of 
condition for disgust ratings, F(2, 58) = 10.85, p < .001.  Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons showed that participants felt significantly more disgusted when exposed to 
imitation vomit (M = 3.29, SD = 2.15) than when exposed to ice water (M = 1.20, SD = 
1.58; p < .001) or lukewarm water (M = 1.05, SD = 1.32: p < .001), with no significant 
differences between the latter two.  A one-way ANOVA indicated a significant main 
effect of condition for discomfort ratings, F(2, 58) = 10.28, p < .001.  Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons showed that exposure to ice water (M = 2.90, SD = 1.74; p = .001), and 
imitation vomit (M = 3.14, SD = 1.62; p < .001) induced significantly more discomfort 
than exposure to lukewarm water (M = 1.10, SD = 1.30) (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Ratings of Discomfort and Disgust per Condition (Note: ** p < .01) 
 
DS across conditions 
A univariate ANOVA was conducted with condition (disgust, discomfort, neutral) 
as independent variable and DS as dependent variable.  The lack of a main effect of 
condition, F(2, 58) = 2.883, n.s., indicated that DS was equally distributed across 
conditions.  DS in participants in the disgust condition (M = 52.62, SD = 13.81) did not 
differ from DS in participants in the discomfort (M = 61.80, SD = 15.28) or the neutral 
condition (M = 60.65, SD = 10.61).  
 
Affect Induction and Judging Moral Violations 
Punishment 
A 3 (condition: disgust, discomfort, neutral) X 2 (violation type: purity, non-
purity) mixed-model ANOVA showed a significant violation type by condition 
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comparisons of non-purity and purity violations for each condition showed that in the 
disgust condition, there was a main effect of violation type, F(1, 20) = 5.00, p = .037, 
with more severe punishment recommended for purity (M = 4.50, SD = .98) than non-
purity violations (M = 4.17, SD = .77).  In the discomfort condition, there was a marginal 
main effect of violation type, F(1, 19) = 4.23, p = .054, with more severe punishment 
recommended for non-purity (M = 4.18, SD = .84) than purity violations (M = 3.97, SD = 
1.00).  Finally, in the neutral condition, there was no main effect of violation type, F(1, 
19) = .072, n.s., with equal punishment recommended for non-purity (M = 4.41, SD = 
.77) and purity violations (M = 4.45, SD = .81) (see Figure 4).   
 
 
Figure 4. Recommended Punishment per Violation Type per Condition  
(Note: ** p <.05, * p = .05) 
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Morality 
 For morality ratings, there was no main effect of condition, F(2, 58) = .26, n.s., 
or an interaction of condition by violation type, F(2, 58) = 2.20, n.s.  So, participants 
rated vignettes overall as equally immoral when exposed to the imitation vomit (M = 
4.80, SD = .84) as when exposed to the ice water (M = 4.79, SD = .83, n.s.) or the 
lukewarm water (M = 4.84, SD = .75, n.s.).  There was also no difference in perceived 
immorality between participants exposed to the latter two.  
Disgust 
Similarly, there was no main effect, F(2, 58) = .48, n.s. or interaction effect, F(2, 
58) = .33, n.s. for disgust ratings.  So, participants rated vignettes overall as equally 
disgusting when exposed to the imitation vomit (M = 3.97, SD = 1.17) as when exposed 
to the ice water (M = 3.99, SD = 1.02, n.s.) or the lukewarm water (M = 4.24, SD = .67, 
n.s.).  In addition, there was no difference in perceived disgust between participants 
exposed to the latter two.  
 
DS and Judgment of Moral Violations 
 The role of DS in judgment of moral violations was examined via linear 
regression with disgust, morality and punishment ratings for pure and impure violations 
as outcome variables, and DS as independent variable.  Results indicated that DS 
significantly predicted how disgusting participants found purity (B = .50, p < .001), but 
not non-purity violations (B = .12, n.s.), how morally wrong participants found purity (B 
= .33, p = .010) and non-purity (B = .29, p = .022) violations, and how much punishment 
they recommended for purity (B = .29, p = .037) but not non-purity (B = .16, n.s.) 
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violations.  DS remained a significant predictor of all of these factors after controlling for 
negative affect (PANAS).   
 
Discussion 
In the current study, where disgust and discomfort were induced with the same 
intensity, there were no significant differences between judgments made during disgust 
and discomfort induction.  This finding supports the notion that discomfort may have 
exerted a stronger influence than disgust on moral judgments in study one due to the 
greater intensity with which it was elicited.  The comparison of purity and non-purity 
violations did reveal a specific, albeit more limited role of disgust in judgments about 
moral violations.  Participants who had their hand submerged in imitation vomit 
recommended harsher punishment for moral violations of purity (e.g., urinating on 
someone’s car door handle) than for violations unrelated to purity (e.g., keying 
someone’s car).  This finding suggests that disgust may be uniquely informative when 
judging violations that are characterized by a sense of impurity.  This finding is 
consistent with research by Rozin and colleagues (1999) showing that violations of 
Divinity/Purity are most closely associated with disgust, and research by Horberg and 
colleagues (2009) showing that disgust priming influenced moral evaluations regarding 
virtues and violations of purity, but not of fairness.   
The findings of study two also showed that DS predicted how disgusting, morally 
wrong and deserving of punishment participants found purity violations, with more 
severe judgments associated with greater levels of DS.  Individual differences in DS have 
previously been shown to predict more severe judgments of homosexuals (Inbar et al., 
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2009; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010), criminals (Jones & Fitness, 2008), immigrants 
(Hodson & Costello, 2007; Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, & Wickens, 2007), drug 
addicts, and homeless people (Harris & Fiske, 2006).  These previous findings are quite 
consistent with those of the current study showing that DS may be particularly predictive 
of violations related to impurity.  Arguably, the groups of people judged more harshly by 
those high in DS in prior research (e.g., Inbar et al., 2009) largely represent those that are 
perceived as being impure.  For example, drug addicts and homeless people are typically 
associated with disease, misfortune or moral taint, all of which elicit disgust due to their 
perceived contaminating properties (Rozin, Markwith, & McCauley, 1994).  These 
findings also highlight that moral judgments of individuals high in DS may significantly 
differ from those low in DS when an element of impurity is a characteristic of the 
violation.  
These results contribute significantly to the current literature by providing some 
insight into the specificity of disgust’s role in judgments about moral violations as well as 
how DS may inform such judgments.  Given that an element of impurity in the violation 
may be required for state or trait disgust to influence judgments about such violations, it 
remains unclear if reducing the experience of disgust or experiencing a state that is the 
opposite of disgust also influences moral judgments.  Recent research suggests that a 
cleanliness induction immediately following a disgust induction lessens the severity of 
participants’ judgments about others’ misbehavior that is typically observed after disgust 
induction (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008).  However, other research indicates that 
cleanliness inductions may also lead to increased severity of moral judgments (Zhong, 
Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010).  Moreover, no studies to date have examined if a 
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cleanliness induction has a specific influence on purity violations or if it affects 
judgments regarding all violations equally.  Finally, it is unclear if the demonstrated 
effect of reduced (Schnall, Benton et al., 2008) or increased (Zhong et al., 2010) severity 
in moral judgments is specifically associated with feeling clean, or if it is an artifact of 
feeling positive, due to the association between cleanliness and positivity.  Finally, it is 
unclear from current findings how a disgust induction and a cleanliness induction 
(without prior disgust induction) may differentially affect judgments about moral 
violations.  In study three, these questions were address by asking participants to 
submerge their hand in imitation vomit (disgust condition), soapy water (cleanliness 
induction) or warm soft fabric (positive condition) while they indicated how immoral, 
deserving of punishment and disgusting they found purity and non-purity violations.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
STUDY THREE.  FUNCTIONAL OPPOSITES, BUT CONCEPTUAL EQUALS? 
HOW FEELING CLEAN AND DISGUSTING AFFECTS JUDGMENTS ABOUT 
MORAL VIOLATIONS 
 
Recent research suggests that feeling clean may lessen severity of morality 
judgments.  For example, Schnall, Benton and colleagues (2008) primed participants with 
the concept of cleanliness immediately following a disgust induction.  This priming 
occurred via either cognitive (i.e., a scrambled sentence task containing words that 
referred to cleanliness and washing) or physical means (i.e., washing one’s hands), and 
following this phase, participants were asked to rate how morally wrong they found a 
range of moral dilemmas.  The cleanliness manipulation significantly reduced the 
severity of participants’ moral judgments, supporting the notion that while disgust 
renders moral judgments more severe, cleanliness makes them milder.  Other research 
however, showed increased severity of moral judgments regarding others’ wrongdoings 
after cleanliness priming (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Zhong et al., 2010).  In studies by 
Zhong and colleagues (2010), participants were asked to clean their hands with antiseptic 
wipes, or not, prior to indicating how morally wrong they found various moral issues 
(study one).  In a second and third study, participants visualized themselves as clean or 
dirty (via a script provided by the experimenter) prior to making moral judgments.  
Overall, moral judgments were more severe for participants in the clean condition than 
for those in the neutral (study one) or the disgust (study two and three) condition.  
Finally, in a recent study by Helzer and Pizarro (2011), participants who received an 
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indirect (a visual reminder of cleanliness in the lab) and a direct (i.e., use of antiseptic 
wipes) cleanliness prime made harsher moral judgments than participants in a control 
condition, in particular for violations involving sexual impurity (e.g., having sex in one’s 
grandmother’s bed, biological siblings having sex).   
The research examining how cleanliness affects moral decision-making to date 
offers an inconsistent picture at best.  This may be partially attributed to differences in 
methodologies used.  For example, some studies examined the influence of cleanliness 
induction on moral judgments after prior disgust priming (Schnall, Benton, et al., 2008) 
while others examined cleanliness without prior disgust induction (Helzer & Pizarro, 
2011; Zhong et al., 2010).  Some studies also compared cleanliness induction with 
disgust induction (Schnall, Benton, et al, 2008; Zhong et al., 2010 studies 2 and 3) while 
other studies examine the influence of cleanliness compared to neutral affect (Zhong et 
al., 2010 study 1; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011).  To clarify how moral judgments are affected 
differentially by disgust versus cleanliness induction, a disgust condition as well as a 
cleanliness condition (without prior disgust induction) is required because this would 
allow for direct comparison of how these two affective states influence judgments about 
moral violations while holding other factors constant (e.g., type of violations, one-phase 
paradigm, timing between rating different violations).  Since only two studies have been 
conducted that directly compare disgust and cleanliness inductions (see study 2 and 3 by 
Zhong et al., 2010), replication of these findings is necessary prior to drawing definitive 
conclusions on the basis of this limited evidence.  
The above mentioned studies examining how cleanliness affects moral judgments 
(Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Schnall, Benton, et al., 2008; Zhong et al., 2010) also do not 
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provide any information regarding the influence of cleanliness independent of the 
positivity commonly associated with feeling clean.  Therefore, it is unclear whether the 
demonstrated role of cleanliness is unique to cleanliness or rather caused by broad 
positive affect.  Indeed, if the positivity associated with cleanliness causes the 
demonstrated effects, a happiness induction is expected to lead to similar results. 
Cleanliness, when used to alleviate disgust (e.g., Schnall, Benton, et al., 2008), is likely 
associated with an increase in positive affect, or at least a decrease in negative affect. 
Cleanliness without prior disgust induction however, may not be as closely linked to 
positive affect.  A cleanliness induction may result in activation of appraisals that are 
specific to the construct of being and feeling clean, such as a sense of moral superiority 
(e.g., Zhong et al., 2010).   
To illuminate the unique role of cleanliness, independent of positive affect, 
participants in study three were asked to rate various moral violations during a direct 
cleanliness induction (hand submersion in warm soapy water) as well as a positive affect 
induction (hand submersion in warm soft fabric).  To compare the influence of 
cleanliness and disgust inductions on moral judgments, study three also consisted of a 
disgust induction (hand submersion in imitation vomit, identical to study two).  Morality 
ratings were anticipated to be more severe in the clean than in the positive condition, due 
to the anticipated softening influence of positive affect on judgments overall.  Judgments 
about moral violations were also expected to be more severe in the clean and the disgust 
condition than in the positive condition, given prior demonstrations that both disgust and 
cleanliness are associated with increased moral severity.  Greater differences were 
expected between purity and non-purity violations in the disgust and cleanliness 
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condition than in the positive condition, given that disgust and cleanliness bear strong 
relationships with purity or lack thereof, while specific appraisals regarding purity are not 
typically found in association with general positive affect.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 Sixty-two undergraduate students (N = 62, 73% female, 68% Caucasian) 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit.    
 
Materials 
Moral Transgressions.  Participants were presented with the same 20 moral 
transgressions (10 representing impurity, 10 not representing impurity) that were used in 
study two.  The only difference was that the name “John” as actor for all violations was 
replaced by 20 different male names (one for each transgression), to clarify that each 
transgression had been committed by a different person. 
Affect Induction.  Affect was induced via submersion of participants’ left hand in one 
of three textures based on pilot dataiii (depending on the condition they were assigned to): 
90-degree soapy water in the clean condition, soft warm fabric in the positive condition, 
or imitation vomit without a glove at room temperature in the disgust condition.  The 
soapy water consisted of bubble bath soap, stirred up to create visible soap foam on the 
water. The chenille fabric used in the positive condition was made into a stuffed tube in 
which participants were asked to place their hand. A separate pocket was created at the 
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bottom of the tube, to insert a heated pad, warming the entire tube without directly 
touching the participant’s hand.  The cleanliness and positive condition elicited equal 
intensity of positive affect, while participants in the pilot study felt significantly cleaner 
in the cleanliness condition than in the positive condition. The disgust condition in this 
study was identical to that in study two. 
Ratings.  Participants were asked to indicate, on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely) how morally wrong they found each of the 20 transgressions.  Participants 
were also asked to indicate how disgusting they found each transgression on a scale from 
0 (not at all disgusting) to 7 (extremely disgusting), and how deserving of punishment 
they found each transgression on a scale from 0 (not at all deserving of punishment) to 7 
(extremely deserving of punishment). 
Questionnaires.  The Disgust Scale – Revised (DS-R; Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 
1994, modified by Olatunji et al., 2007) (Alpha = .87), used in studies one and two, was 
also completed as part of the study.  The Negative Affect scale (Alpha = .83) of the 
Positive and Negative Affectivity Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), used 
in studies one and two was also completed as part of the current study. 
 
Procedure  
Participants, randomly assigned to one of three conditions (cleanliness, positivity, 
or disgust) received the same instructions as did participants in study one and two, with 
the exception that after completing the questionnaires and rating the moral violations, 
participants were asked to indicate to what extent, on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 7 
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(extremely), the hand submersion task made them feel clean, positive, disgusted and 
negative. 
 
Results 
 
Vignette Manipulation Check 
 To ensure that the impure violations used in the current study were seen as more 
disgusting, equally morally wrong and equally deserving of punishment as pure 
violations, disgust, immorality and punishment ratings for purity and non-purity 
violations were entered in separate repeated measures analyses.  The analysis for disgust 
ratings showed a significant main effect of purity, F(1, 60) = 255.46, p < .001, with 
purity violations perceived as significantly more disgusting  (M = 5.59, SD = .84) than 
non-purity violations (M = 2.44, SD = 1.66).  The analysis for morality ratings also 
showed a significant main effect of purity, F(1, 60) = 13.37, p = .001, with non-purity 
violations rated as significantly more immoral  (M = 5.00, SD = .76) than purity 
violations (M = 4.59, SD = 1.15).  Lastly, punishment ratings did not show a significant 
main effect of purity F(1, 60) = .166, n.s., as non-purity violations (M = 4.33, SD = .85) 
were rated equally deserving of punishment as purity violations (M = 4.30, SD = 1.03). 
 
Affect Induction Manipulation Check  
 To confirm that exposure to soapy water induced more cleanliness and equal 
positivity than exposure to soft warm fabric, and to test if imitation vomit induced more 
disgust and negativity than soapy water and soft warm fabric, cleanliness, positivity, 
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disgust and negativity ratings were entered in a 4 (rating: clean, positive, disgusting, 
negative) X 3 (condition: soapy water, warm soft fabric, imitation vomit) mixed model 
ANOVA.  This revealed a significant rating by condition interaction, F(6, 180) = 12.40, p 
< .001.  One-way ANOVAs were then conducted to test main effects of condition for 
each of the ratings.  Results indicated a significant main effect of condition for 
cleanliness ratings, F(2, 60) = 9.64, p < .001.  Follow-up pairwise comparisons showed 
that participants felt significantly more clean when exposed to soapy water (M = 3.95, SD 
= 1.66, p = .001) and soft warm fabric (M = 4.38, SD = 1.94, p < .001) than when 
exposed to imitation vomit (M = 2.14, SD = 1.65), with no significant differences 
between soapy water and soft warm fabric.  A significant main effect of condition for 
positivity end ratings was also observed, F(2, 60) = 6.58, p = .003.  Follow-up pairwise 
comparisons showed that exposure to soft warm fabric (M = 4.19, SD = 1.44) induced 
more positivity than exposure to soapy water (M = 2.95, SD = 1.77; p = .012) and 
imitation vomit (M = 2.52, SD = 1.40; p = .001), with no significant differences between 
the latter two.  There was a significant main effect of condition for disgust ratings, F(2, 
60) = 11.53, p < .001, with imitation vomit inducing significantly more disgust (M = 
3.67, SD = 1.98) than soapy water (M = 1.29, SD = 1.93; p < .001) and soft warm fabric 
(M = 1.24, SD = 1.70, p < .001), and no significant differences between the latter two. 
Similarly, results showed a significant main effect of condition for negativity ratings, 
F(2, 60) = 11.50, p < .001, with imitation vomit (M = 3.67, SD = 1.83) inducing more 
negativity than soft warm fabric (M = .90, SD = 1.48; p < .001) or soapy water (M = 2.43, 
SD = 2.23, p = .036).  Furthermore, soapy water induced more negativity than soft warm 
fabric (p = .011) (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Cleanliness, Positivity, Disgust and Negativity ratings per condition  
(Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05) 
 
 
DS across conditions 
A univariate ANOVA was conducted with condition (disgust, clean, positive) as 
independent variable and DS as dependent variable.  The lack of a main effect of 
condition, F(2, 59) = .124, n.s., indicated that DS was equally distributed across 
conditions.  DS in participants in the disgust condition (M = 55.25, SD = 15.90) did not 
differ from DS of participants in the clean (M = 56.57, SD = 15.21) or the positive 
condition (M = 54.05, SD = 18.05).  
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Affect Induction and Judging Moral Violations 
Analysis of Variance 
Morality, disgust and punishment ratings were entered in separate 2 (violation 
type: purity, non-purity) X 3 (condition: soapy water, warm soft fabric, imitation vomit) 
mixed model ANOVAs.  
Punishment 
 Results showed a significant main effect of condition for punishment ratings, F(2, 
60) = 3.44, p = .038.  Pairwise comparisons showed that participants recommended more 
punishment when they held their hand in imitation vomit (M = 4.68, SD = .89) than when 
they placed their hand in warm soft fabric (M = 4.01, SD = 1.03, p = .012). However, 
there was no significant difference in recommended punishment between these conditions 
and the soapy water condition (M = 4.25, SD = .82, n.s.) (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Recommended Punishment per Condition (Note: * p < .05) 
 
*	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Morality 
There was no main effect of condition for morality ratings, F(2, 60) = .10, n.s., or 
interaction between condition and purity, F(2, 60) = .51, n.s..  So, participants rated 
vignettes overall as equally morally wrong when exposed to the imitation vomit (M = 
4.78, SD = 1.07) as when exposed to the soapy water (M = 4.87, SD = .91, n.s.) and there 
was no difference in perceived immorality for participants exposed to the soapy water 
and those exposed to the warm soft fabric (M = 4.75, SD = .93, n.s.). 
Disgust 
There was no main effect of condition for disgust ratings, F(2, 60) = .38, n.s., or 
interaction between condition and purity, F(2, 60) = .47, n.s..  So, participants rated 
vignettes overall as equally disgusting when exposed to the imitation vomit (M = 3.99, 
SD = 1.02) as when exposed to the soapy water (M = 4.17, SD = 1.12, n.s.) and there was 
no difference in perceived disgust for participants exposed to the soapy water and those 
exposed to the warm soft fabric (M = 3.89, SD = 1.08, n.s.). 
 
Regression Analysis 
Given that the affect induction procedures did not result in distinct groups (i.e., 
soapy water did not induce significantly more cleanliness than warm soft fabric, and 
warm soft fabric induced significantly more positivity than soapy water), the extent to 
which participant ratings of cleanliness, disgust, positivity and negativity predicted 
judgments about non-purity and purity violations across the three conditions was 
examined in a regression analysis.  Specifically, cleanliness and disgust in response to the 
affective inductions were examined as predictors of disgust, immorality and punishment 
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ratings of non-purity and purity violations.  The extent to which cleanliness and disgust 
remained significant predictors after controlling for positivity or negativity respectively 
was also examined.  
 Across conditions, the degree to which participants felt clean as a result of their 
affect induction procedure predicted how much punishment they recommended for non-
purity violations (B = -.30, p = .018), with more felt cleanliness resulting in reduced 
punishment.  After controlling for positivity, cleanliness remained a significant predictor 
of punishment (B = -.31, p = .035).  Cleanliness was not predictive of judgments of 
disgust or immorality.   
The degree to which the inductions made participants feel disgusted across 
conditions predicted how disgusting they found non-purity (B = .25, p = .046), and purity 
violations (B = .27, p = .030), as well as how immoral they found purity (B = .26, p = 
.041) but not non-purity violations (B = .10, n.s.).  Lastly, the extent to which participants 
felt disgusted as a result of the affect induction procedure predicted how much 
punishment they recommended for non-purity (B = .30, p = .016), and purity violations 
(B = .29, p = .021).  After controlling for negativity during the inductions however, 
disgust no longer predicted any of these outcomes. 
These regressions were repeated for each condition separately, and revealed 
largely similar effects, with one important exception.  For participants exposed to soft 
warm fabric (i.e., the participants who reported feeling most positive (M = 4.19, SD = 
1.44) and most clean (M = 4.38, SD = 1.94)), cleanliness was not a significant predictor 
of any judgments.  However, after controlling for its shared variance with positivity, 
cleanliness became a significant positive predictor of immorality of purity violations (B = 
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.63, p = .010), with greater cleanliness resulting in more perceived immorality.   
Positivity was a marginal predictor of cleanliness in the opposite direction, with more 
positivity associated with less perceived immorality (B = -.44, p = .059).   
 
DS and Judgment of Moral Violations 
 The role of DS in judgment of moral violations was examined via linear 
regression with disgust, morality and punishment ratings for pure and impure violations 
as outcome variables, and DS as independent variable.  Results indicated that DS 
significantly predicted how disgusting participants found purity (B = .58, p < .001), but 
not non-purity violations (B = .17, n.s.), how morally wrong participants found purity (B 
= .30, p = .017) and non-purity (B = .40, p = .001) violations, and how much punishment 
they recommended for purity (B = .31, p = .014) and non-purity (B = .36, p = .004) 
violations.  DS remained a significant predictor of all of these factors after controlling for 
negative affect (PANAS).  
 
DS and Affect Induction Ratings 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were conducted to test the association 
between trait levels of disgust (DS), and state levels of disgust, cleanliness, positivity and 
negativity.  DS was negatively correlated with cleanliness ratings (r = -.27, p < .05), with 
those higher in DS feeling less clean across conditions.  DS was positively correlated 
with felt disgust (r = .31, p < .05), as well as negativity (r = .26, p < .05), with those 
higher in DS feeling more disgusted and negative across conditions.  There was no 
correlation between DS and how positive participants felt overall (r = -.18, n. s.). 
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Discussion 
Participants in the present study were asked to place their hand in lukewarm 
soapy water to elicit cleanliness and positivity, in a roll of soft warm fabric to elicit equal 
levels of positivity in the absence of cleanliness, and in imitation vomit to elicit disgust 
and negativity. Consistent with expectations, imitation vomit elicited significantly more 
disgust and negativity than soapy water and soft warm fabric.  Contrary to expectations 
however, soft warm fabric elicited more positivity than soapy water and equal levels of 
cleanliness.  For these reasons, a regression approach was used to examine how 
experienced cleanliness, disgust, positivity and negativity – as opposed to specific 
conditions – affected judgments about moral violations.  
The regression analyses showed that the cleaner participants felt as a consequence 
of the affect inductions, the less punishment they recommended for non-purity, but not 
purity violations.  Cleanliness remained a significant predictor of punishment after 
controlling for positivity, suggesting that its influence on recommended punishment was 
not caused by the positivity associated with cleanliness.  The finding of reduced severity 
of judgments when participants feel cleaner is consistent with research by Schnall, 
Benton and Harvey (2008), who demonstrated lessened severity of judgments in 
participants who had been allowed to cleanse themselves after a disgust induction, as 
opposed to those who had not been given this opportunity.  Because there was no prior 
disgust induction, these findings were surprising.  When examining specifically how 
feeling clean affected judgments in the condition where participants felt the most clean 
and positive (soft warm fabric), more felt cleanliness predicted more severe perceived 
immorality of purity violations after controlling for the positivity of exposure to the 
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fabric.  Indeed, exposure to the soft warm fabric elicited both cleanliness and positive 
affect.  Examination of the regression coefficients in the positive condition showed that 
while the positivity of soft warm fabric had a negative slope (i.e., more positive feelings 
led to less perceived immorality), cleanliness had a positive slope (i.e., more cleanliness 
led to more perceived immorality).  Once the severity-reducing influence of positivity 
was controlled, more cleanliness predicted more perceived immorality.  This finding is 
consistent with prior findings about cleanliness priming without disgust induction (Zhong 
et al., 2010).  
Regression analyses predicting disgust and negativity ratings showed that the 
more disgusted participants felt as a consequence of the affect induction, the more 
disgusting, immoral and deserving of punishment they found non-purity and purity 
violations.  However, after controlling for negativity of the affect induction, disgust did 
not remain a significant predictor of disgust, morality or punishment ratings.  This 
finding raises the possibility that the documented role of disgust in moral judgment (e.g., 
Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008) may be accounted for by intense 
negativity associated with disgust.  Similar to study two, study three showed that DS was 
a significant predictor of how morally wrong, disgusting and deserving of punishment 
participants found moral transgressions, with those higher in DS showing more severe 
judgments overall.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Prior research demonstrates that disgust can play an important role in moral 
decision-making, as shown in significant correlations between how disgusted participants 
feel (as a state or a trait) and how severely they judge others’ moral violations.  
Participants made to feel disgusted via exposure to disgust-associated words (Wheatley & 
Haidt, 2005), smells (Schnall, Haidt, et al. 2008; Pizarro, Inbar, & Bloom, 2012), tastes 
(Eskine et al., 2011) or images (Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008) make more morally severe 
judgments than participants who have not been induced with disgust or than participants 
who have been induced with sadness.  These findings suggest that disgust plays a 
significant role in moral decision-making.  However, these findings do not rule out the 
possibility that the observed effect of disgust on moral decision-making is an artifact of 
negative affect more broadly.  
The current studies examined the unique role of disgust in judgments about moral 
violations.  Specifically, study one examined how disgust, compared to discomfort, 
influences moral judgments.  Disgust and discomfort are negative mood states that are 
both characterized by a sense of certainty about what is happening (Tiedens & Linton, 
2001) and an associated tendency to rely on heuristics such as how one feels during the 
time of judgment (e.g., Lerner, et al., 1998).  An experimental paradigm was employed 
where disgust and discomfort inductions occurred during, rather than before, judgments 
about moral violations.  In this one-phase paradigm, differential effects due to a 
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dissipation disparity between disgust and discomfort were reduced.  Under these 
experimental conditions, study one failed to show a unique role of disgust in judgments 
about moral transgressions.  In fact, the finding revealed more severe moral judgments by 
participants who had experienced discomfort than by those who had been in the neutral 
condition or in the disgust condition, with no significant differences between the disgust 
and neutral condition.   
The significant difference between judgments in the discomfort and neutral 
condition in study one suggests that disgust may not be unique in its effect on moral 
judgments.  However, closer examination of the affect inductions in study one revealed 
an intensity disparity between discomfort and disgust such that disgust was induced with 
significantly less intensity than discomfort.  This intensity disparity leaves open the 
possibility that participants’ moral judgments may have been more strongly influenced by 
discomfort because this was the most intensely induced mood state.  Table 1 shows that 
in prior studies demonstrating a unique influence of disgust, compared to sadness, on 
moral judgments (Horberg et al., 2009; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010; Schnall, Haidt, et 
al., 2008) disgust affect in the disgust condition was consistently induced more intensely 
than sadness affect in the sadness condition. 
The present findings, considered in the context of the available literature shown in 
Table 1 suggest that the previously documented unique role of disgust in moral judgment 
may be an artifact of an intensity disparity.  The medium to large effect sizes of these 
emotion inductions in prior research (see Table 1) support this interpretation of the data.   
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Table 1  Means and Standard Deviations of Reported Disgust, Sadness, and Discomfort 
in Respective Conditions, and Emotion of Most Influence on Moral Judgments 
 
Disgust 
in DISG 
Sadness 
In SAD 
Discomfort 
in DISC 
Study 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Cohen’s d Most 
Influential 
in moral 
judgments 
 
Schnall et al., 2008 
Horberg et al., 2009 
Moretti et al., 2010 
Study one 
 
11.35 (5.63) 
5.55 (1.35) 
5.51 (0.61) 
2.96 (1.87) 
 
4.72 (3.05) 
4.57 (1.27) 
4.87 (1.31) 
N/A 
 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
3.56 (1.78) 
 
1.48 
0.62 
0.65 
0.34 
 
Disgust 
Disgust 
Disgust 
Discomfort 
 
Note: bold font indicates the more intensely induced emotion 
 
Given this intensity disparity, it is currently unclear if the unique effect of disgust 
on moral judgments in prior research, (Horberg et al., 2009; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 
2010; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008) and discomfort in study one, can be attributed to the 
greater intensity with which this affect was induced, or to unique characteristics of 
disgust (vs. sadness) and discomfort (vs. disgust), respectively.  In an attempt to rule out 
this intensity disparity account, the intensity of disgust and discomfort was matched in 
study two.  Under these experimental conditions, no significant differences were 
observed between those in the disgust and discomfort condition in moral judgments.  This 
finding suggests that the intensity of affect alone may have significant influences on 
moral judgment.  Prior research has demonstrated that emotional intensity influences 
other cognitive processes as well.  For example, emotional intensity can affect attention 
via a narrowing of focus toward emotional stimuli at the expense of other information 
(Pavelchak, Antil & Munch, 1988).  Recognition memory has also been found to function 
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better for items of low and moderate affect intensity than for those of extreme intensity 
(Schaefer, Fletcher, Pottage, Alexander, & Brown, 2009).  The findings in study one and 
two complement such research in demonstrating that intensity of affect in general, rather 
than specific emotional states, influences judgments about moral violations.   
Although study one suggested that disgust does not uniquely inform judgments 
about moral violations, study two did find support for a unique, yet more modest, 
contribution of disgust in decisions about moral violations of purity.  A more 
parsimonious view may then be that disgust informs judgments about certain types of 
violations.  Participants in study two who felt disgusted recommended more severe 
punishment for moral violations of physical, emotional or spiritual purity than for 
violations unrelated to purity.  This finding is consistent with prior research showing that 
disgust is specifically associated with violations of purity (Rozin, et al., 1999) and that 
disgust priming is particularly influential in moral judgments about purity transgressions, 
but not fairness transgressions (Horberg et al., 2009). Given that homosexuality is often 
associated with impurity as well (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997), this finding 
also coincides with recent research showing that a noxious odor (i.e., disgust induction) 
increased negative judgments of gay, but not straight men (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 
2012).  
Detection of impurity when one feels disgusted may lead to strong punitive 
responses to maximize distance between the self and the object of disgust.  These 
observations can be accounted for by a Moral Character Model (MCM) that holds that 
disgust serves to motivate people to maintain good moral character.  Being perceived as 
having good moral character is advantageous from a social perspective because it allows 
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for formation of close interpersonal connections between people and helps prevent 
rejection from one’s in-group (Kahan, 1998).  Social connectivity is a central aspect to 
human life that increases likelihood of survival (Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2009).  Social 
rejection is considered one of the three main threats to wellbeing (Rachman, 2004) and 
humans may be neurologically wired to avoid social rejection and seek out social 
connections.  Indeed, recent research showed that experiencing social rejection activates 
the neural circuitries that are typically associated with the experience of physical pain and 
the motivational tendencies to ameliorate this pain (Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2009).  
Being perceived as having good moral character may lower the risk of social rejection.  
When no information is available about others’ moral character, people tend to quickly 
assess this based on the behaviors of others.  For example, in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
where two players obtain equal gain if they cooperate (both $5), but if one player 
cooperates while the other player defects, the latter gets a greater gain ($10) and the 
former obtains nothing ($0), participants may initially play under the assumption that the 
other player’s moral character is potentially questionable.  However, over time, 
participants tend to cooperate in such a game when they perceive the other person as 
morally trustworthy (i.e., the other person cooperates) (Rilling et al., 2007).  From an 
evolutionary perspective, good moral character thus promotes survival via connections 
with others, and experiencing disgust may serve as a danger signal that one’s character 
may be in jeopardy (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
Disgust has been labeled an emotion that provides clear boundaries and moral 
norms regarding acceptable behaviors (Miller, 1997). Disgust also offers strong 
guidelines for managing norm violations, and urges the ingroup to follow through with 
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these guidelines to avoid rejection (Looy, 2004).  When participants are asked to consider 
their own immoral deeds (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) or think of themselves as dirty 
(Zhong et al., 2010), their concerns about appearing disgusting increase.  These concerns 
in turn elicit fears of social rejection or exclusion (Rachman, 2004).  According to the 
MCM, depicted in Figure 7, being associated with disgust can pose a threat to one’s 
moral character, and thereby increases the need to assert one’s moral virtue.  This can be 
done by maximizing the distance from immoral or impure deeds via severe judgment of 
such deeds. Such condemnation communicates knowledge of and adherence to moral 
norms within the community.  Alternatively, one can avert the threat of being considered 
impure via cleansing or by engaging in a pro-social activity.  Consistent with this notion, 
experimentally induced threats to moral character were found to result in increased 
contamination-related concerns and associated action tendencies (e.g., washing; Doron, 
Sar-El, & Mikulincer, 2012).   
While a threat to moral character may motivate pro-social actions, the motivation 
to boost moral character should decrease once the threat has been averted.  Indeed, 
participants in a recent study first asked to think about their own immoral deeds and then 
asked to volunteer in another study, were significantly less likely to volunteer if they had 
first been given an opportunity to wash their hands than if they had not been given a 
chance to “wash away their sins” (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).  Decreasing threat to 
moral character by washing may alleviate participants’ need to assert their moral virtue 
via a pro-social deed.  In fact, cleansing has been documented to alleviate participants’ 
need to explain or justify their actions (Lee & Schwarz, 2010b).  According to the MCM, 
any of the proposed mechanisms to communicate moral virtue (i.e., cleansing, pro-social 
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deeds, condemnation) should restore moral character, but the most effective mechanism 
may depend on the source of the threat to one’s moral character.  This is in line with 
recent research showing that participants who committed a verbal transgression (e.g., 
telling a lie) expressed an interest in cleansing via mouthwash, while those who told a lie 
via email were more motivated to cleanse via hand sanitizer (Lee & Schwarz, 2010a).   
   
 
DISGUST INDUCTION 
↓ 
PERCEIVED THREAT TO MORAL CHARACTER 
“Others might find me disgusting, and worthy of rejection!” 
↓ 
NEED TO ELIMINATE THREAT 
Cleansing to remove cause of threat  
Prosocial deeds to assure others of one’s moral excellence 
Maximize distance between self and morally questionable others via condemnation 
 
 
Figure 7. Threatened Moral Character after Disgust Induction 
 
Recently, Lee and Schwarz (2011) proposed that pro-social deeds are motivated 
by guilt.  Guilt undoubtedly plays an important role in increasing motivation to 
compensate for prior misdeeds (Haidt, 2003). Guilt is thought to result from the belief of 
having caused harm to others (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994), and pro-social 
deeds restore relationships with others.  The pro-social action tendencies associated with 
the MCM however, are thought to restore one’s moral reputation, rather than specific 
relationships.  Restoring one’s reputation will reaffirm one’s status as a virtuous member 
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of the community.  According to the MCM, this restoration is primarily driven by 
concerns about what group members might think (e.g., moral condemnation) and do (e.g., 
social exclusion) because of one’s misbehavior.  The MCM posits that participants’ 
concerns about being judged negatively, especially in situations where others witness 
their morally questionable actions, increase the likelihood that people will engage in 
restorative actions. 
Although the MCM predicts overall condemnation of violations (purity and non-
purity), the current results showed that disgust induction affects purity violations in 
particular.  Disgust may have resulted in more severe punishment of purity violations 
because these violations are disgusting themselves.  That is, the disgust felt due to contact 
with the imitation vomit may have seemed more relevant to the impure violation to be 
judged.  If a feeling is clearly irrelevant to the situation to be judged, it may not influence 
subsequent moral judgments.  Prior research (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962; Sinclair, 
Hoffman, Mark, Martin, Pickering, 1994) shows that unrelated emotions do not influence 
judgments when participants identify their source as irrelevant to the task at hand.  Due to 
the congruence between the affect experienced as a result of the affective induction and 
the affect the violation itself induces, the affective symmetry may potentiate judgments 
about violations of purity. 
Evaluation of purity violations during a disgust induction may have also induced 
disgust more intensely than evaluation of violations unrelated to purity.  Indeed, purity 
violations are thought to elicit disgust themselves (e.g., Rozin et al., 1999), and such 
disgust combined with that induced via the imitation vomit may have resulted in greater 
overall disgust while rating purity than non-purity violations.  As previously noted, the 
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intensity with which an emotion is induced can contribute to its influence on associated 
processes (e.g., (Pavelchak et al., 1988; Schaefer, Fletcher, et al., 2009).  The more severe 
punishment for purity violations may reflect a more intense disgust experience when 
rating purity versus non-purity violations.  
Given the potentially unique role of disgust in judgments about purity-violations, 
study three examined the influence of its conceptual opposite, cleanliness, in evaluations 
of such violations.  Study three specifically sought to differentiate the role of cleanliness 
from that of positive affect, and in addition, determine how cleanliness induction, 
compared to disgust induction, affects judgments about moral violations.  Results showed 
that there were no differences in morality ratings between the clean and the disgust 
condition but indicated more severe punishment by participants in the disgust condition 
than by those in the positive condition.  Examination of participant end ratings in linear 
regression analyses showed that across conditions, participants recommended less 
punishment the cleaner they felt, even after controlling for positivity.  However, in the 
condition where participants felt most clean and positive, cleanliness predicted more 
severe immorality ratings for purity violations after controlling for the positivity of 
exposure to the fabric.   
The MCM posits that cleanliness induction without prior disgust induction should 
boost moral character, and this boost is thought to reflect an increase in one’s sense of 
moral superiority (see Figure 8).    
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CLEANLINESS INDUCTION  
without prior disgust induction 
↓ 
PERCEIVED BOOST TO MORAL CHARACTER 
“I am so virtuous and pure!” 
↓ 
PERCEIVED MORAL SUPERIORITY  
Stronger condemnation of others’ misbehavior due to greater contrast with self 
Greater interest in “good deeds” to uphold and enhance moral superiority 
 
Figure 8. Superiority associated with Cleanliness in a Moral Character Model 
 
 
Similar to experiencing threats to moral character (e.g., after disgust induction), 
feeling morally superior may be associated with increased condemnation of others’ 
morally questionable behaviors.  Indeed, recent research has shown that feeling clean 
renders moral judgments more severe (e.g., Helzer & Pizarro, 2011) and Zhong and 
colleagues (2010) found that this association between cleanliness and moral 
condemnation was mediated by elevated moral self-perception.  Condemnation by those 
who feel morally superior may be primarily motivated by a desire to further demonstrate 
moral virtue.  Cleanliness-induced moral virtue may also lead to increased willingness to 
demonstrate one’s moral virtue via pro-social actions.  For example, participants in a 
clean scented room were more likely than those in a neutral smelling room to treat others 
more fairly and were more likely to show interest in volunteering for a charity 
(Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010).  In study three, there were no significant 
differences between moral judgments of those in the disgust condition and those in the 
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clean condition, suggesting that both mood states are associated with similar action 
tendencies, albeit via different motivational processes.  
Trait levels of disgust and cleanliness may moderate how these state affect 
inductions predict moral judgment.  People are believed to vary in how prone they are to 
feeling disgusted (i.e., DS, Haidt, et al., 1994), and this trait may influence the perceived 
threat or boost to moral character associated with a disgust or cleanliness induction, 
respectively.  Overall, individuals high in DS are morally hypervigilant, actively looking 
for and quickly detecting threats to morality (Jones & Fitness, 2008).  Those high in DS 
may also be more concerned about threats to their own moral character (Doron et al., 
2010).  Consequently, they may be more motivated to avert potential threats to their 
moral reputation and demonstrate their moral virtue than individuals who are less 
concerned with threats to moral character.  Indeed, research has shown that those high in 
DS make more severe moral judgments about others’ questionable behavior (e.g., Inbar et 
al, 2009; Horberg et al., 2009) and are more religious (Olatunji, Tolin, Huppert, & Lohr, 
2005) than those lower in DS.  Figure 9 shows that heightened moral concerns for high 
DS individuals may be more pronounced during a disgust induction as this experience 
may more readily signal a threat to one’s moral character.   
Such threats are often socially relevant (i.e., in the eye of the real or imagined 
beholder), and are typically thought not to undermine one’s self-perceived moral 
character.  When disgust is visibly induced, however, the objective may be one of 
resolving the discrepancy between one’s self-perception and others’ perception of the 
self.  This discrepancy between “How you see me” and “How I see me” is often reduced 
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by active engagement in physical cleansing, pro-social deeds, or condemnation of others’ 
misbehaviors (see Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 9. Attention to Moral Character for High DS Individuals 
 
 
Figure 10. Moral Character as Perceived by Self and Others after Disgust Induction 
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People high in self-disgust on the other hand see themselves as morally 
questionable or even inferior, and may lack the motivation to engage in action tendencies 
typically associated with eliminating threatened moral character.  Self-disgust is a 
personality trait consisting of highly critical evaluation of the self, and the belief that the 
self or characteristics of the self are disgusting and repulsive (Overton, Markland, 
Taggert, Bagshaw, & Simpson, 2008).  A recent study found that those high in self-
disgust failed to condemn severe moral violations (Olatunji, David, & Ciesielski, 2012) 
suggesting that personal beliefs about one’s poor moral character (see Figure 11) may 
decrease motivation to convince others of one’s moral virtue, and may consequently be 
associated with a decreased desire to cleanse, condemn immorality, and engage in pro-
social deeds (Olatunji et al., 2012).   
 
 
Figure 11. Moral Character as Perceived by Self and Others for Those High  
in Self-Disgust 
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Given these internal beliefs about one’s moral character and the lack of 
motivation to engage in action tendencies that are socially prescribed, external changes in 
cleanliness state (e.g., via disgust induction) for those high in self-disgust may not 
significantly influence self-perceived moral character and associated moral judgments. 
Although it is unclear if trait cleanliness may be conceptualized as a stable 
propensity to feel clean that is akin to other personality traits, the finding that cleanliness 
levels across conditions in study three were predictive of reduced moral severity, even 
after controlling for positivity, suggests that this variable may uniquely inform moral 
judgments.  Individuals who generally feel clean may be less concerned with others’ 
perceptions about their general moral character.  This variable may overlap with low DS 
to some degree as the less prone one is to feeling disgusted, the more prone they may be 
to feeling clean.  However, the findings from study 3 did indicate a small inverse 
correlation between the two, suggesting that low DS and cleanliness may not be opposing 
ends of the same continuum.  Due to the hypothesized reduced concerns with moral 
character, the MCM predicts that individuals high in trait cleanliness would judge others 
less severely.  Inducing cleanliness above and beyond baseline levels however (e.g., by 
offering already clean people some hand sanitizer) may increase severity of punishment 
due to an artificially elevated moral character.  Consistently, findings from study three 
showed more severe punishment with greater cleanliness in the condition where 
participants felt most clean, after controlling for positivity.  
 
 
 
	   62	  
Limitations 
Although the present investigation furthers current knowledge about how and 
when disgust may influence moral judgments, the results of the current studies should be 
interpreted in light of some limitations.  For example, the affect induction paradigm in 
study three did not adequately produce the intended emotions, despite an initial pilot 
investigation justifying the use of the induction paradigms.  Also, despite employment of 
procedures aimed to prevent habituation (i.e., cleaning hand prior to re-submerging it in 
imitation vomit, or placing hand in lukewarm water prior to re-submerging it in ice 
water), participants reported habituating to hand submersion in the liquids.  Fortunately, 
this habituation is not thought to have had a systematic influence on moral judgments, 
since the vignettes were presented in random order.  
An additional limitation concerns the significant difference in perceived 
immorality between purity and non-purity violations.  The purity violations selected for 
the current studies were rated as less morally wrong overall than the non-purity 
violations.  This difference may have resulted from the selection made from the larger 
pool of violations.  The violations used in the current studies represent both harm and 
purity/non-purity.  In order to match perceived overall immorality for purity and non-
purity violations, the violations that represented impurity may have been less harmful 
than those unrelated to impurity, given the inherent association between disgust/impurity 
and immorality (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009).  Future research should aim to identify purity 
and non-purity moral violations that are truly equal in perceived immorality.  However, 
due to the close association between disgust and immorality, this may be a difficult task.   
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Another limitation of the current research is that it does not provide a direct test of 
the underlying mechanisms of the MCM, as the current findings themselves informed its 
development.  Consequently, no data was gathered regarding participants’ self-perceived 
moral character and whether submersion of one’s hand in imitation vomit actually poses 
a threat to this character.  The link between cleanliness and moral character was derived 
from prior studies showing that a boost in moral character motivates pro-social deeds and 
condemnation (Zhong et al., 2010), and that experimental reduction of participants’ moral 
virtue resulted in increased interest in cleansing (Doron et al., 2012).  The findings of the 
current research fit within the context of the MCM, but further research measuring the 
proposed causal variable (i.e., moral character) is needed.  In future research, 
manipulation of participants’ moral character (e.g., by visually indicating how it 
compares to moral character of peers, as in Doron et al., 2012) could help test the MCM 
more directly.  By comparing moral judgment of those made to think they are morally 
questionable with those made to think they are morally virtuous, the motivating role of 
moral character could be assessed.  Incorporation of a condition where participants’ 
attention is not drawn to their moral character (i.e., no manipulation of moral character) 
would likely serve as an important control comparison.  It is expected that judgments of 
both manipulated groups would not differ significantly from one another, and both would 
be significantly more severe than those of participants not made aware of their moral 
character.  Assessment of underlying cognitions (e.g., worries about others’ perception of 
one’s moral worth, degree of positive and negative affect associated with the moral 
character manipulation) would further help refine the hypothesized MCM mechanisms.  
Finally, testing whether a disgust induction leads to a threat to moral character and if a 
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cleanliness induction leads to a boost, by obtaining moral character ratings before and 
after the affective inductions, would represent an important component to exploring the 
principles underlying the MCM.  
 
Implications 
Despite the study limitations, the current research findings do indicate that the 
intensity with which emotions are induced can affect morally relevant decision-making.   
Comparison of effect sizes suggests that prior research showing the unique effect of 
disgust on moral judgments consistently induced disgust with greater intensity than it did 
the comparison emotion (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010; 
Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008).  This indicates that the unique effect of disgust may have 
been an artifact of these research paradigms and highlights the importance of comparing 
the role of equally intense emotions.  Generating affect induction paradigms that elicit 
different emotions with the same intensity however may be challenging, in part because 
some affective states are inherently associated with greater arousal.  For example, fear is 
associated with greater autonomic arousal and intensity in terms of heart rate, skin 
conductance and respiratory rate than sadness (Kriebig, Wilhelm, Roth, & Gross, 2007).  
Furthermore, some emotions such as disgust are more easily elicited in the laboratory 
than others such as anger (e.g., Gross & Levenson, 1995), adding to the difficulties 
associated with equating intensity of comparison emotions.  Some film clip and image 
databases have been developed to offer researchers affect induction paradigms that may 
reliably induce equally intense emotions (e.g., Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 
2009).  However, the use of video or images may not always be preferred within a given 
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research paradigm.  In the current studies for example, affect was induced while 
participants made moral judgments, and under those conditions, inducing disgust with 
visual cues would have interfered with making such judgments.  Further research 
establishing affect induction paradigms for different sensory modalities that elicit 
emotions with equal intensity could greatly improve the broad field of emotion research, 
in particular how emotions influence distinct cognitive and behavioral processes.    
Further delineation of the role of disgust in moral judgment may have 
implications for legal settings, where the presence of disgusting evidence in a criminal 
case, as well as high trait levels of disgust, has been found to increase mock jurors’ 
conviction rate, and decreases the time or evidence required to decide to convict (Bright 
& Goodman Delahunty, 2006; Jones & Fitness, 2008).  Furthermore, certainty appraisals 
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001) associated with disgust can reduce jury members’ willingness 
to hear and weigh all of the evidence, such as intent of the offender (Young & Saxe, 
2009).  Disgust also leads to harsher punishment of stigmatized groups as a recent study 
demonstrated that disgust toward an African-American defendant predicted agreement 
with extreme forms of punishment (i.e., severe prison sentences, death penalty) (Pearson, 
Dovidio, & Pratto, 2007).  The results of the current studies suggest that jury members’ 
proneness to experience disgust may be especially important to assess during the voir 
dire process of jury selection for crimes (e.g., rape, bloody fight) or criminals (e.g., 
homosexual perpetrator, foreign perpetrator) associated with impurity.  In court cases that 
represent harm without impurity however (e.g., high level fraud), DS may be less 
relevant to assess, as those high and low in DS would likely reach similar verdicts.  
Providing judges and jury members with wipes or hand sanitizer may prevent premature 
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conviction or excessive punishment of purity violators.  By lowering their disgust via 
cleansing, according to the MCM, the moral character of judges and jury members would 
no longer be as threatened, and they would not feel the need to excessively condemn or 
punish others to restore their own moral virtue. 
The MCM may also provide a context for understanding cleansing rituals 
commonly observed in various cultures.  Such rituals may be more intensely practiced by 
those who are perceived by society as morally inferior but wish to elevate their status, for 
example, lower caste groups in India (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994).  Also, recent research 
showed that African American participants have higher levels of DS (Haidt et al., 1994) 
and more frequently use hand sanitizer (e.g., Williams & Turkheimer, 2007) than their 
European American counterparts.  Under segregation laws, African Americans were 
prevented from using the same restrooms, waiting rooms, and restaurants as European 
Americans out of fear that they would contaminate the latter (e.g., Williams, Turkheimer, 
Magee, & Guterbock, 2008).  The demonstrated greater DS and cleanliness concerns in 
African Americans may reflect an attempt to counteract this historical association 
between being Black and being a contaminant (Williams, Abramowitz, & Olatunji, 
2012).   
From the perspective of the MCM, ethnic cleansing might be considered an 
attempt to maximize the difference between a self-proclaimed morally superior group and 
a group considered morally questionable.  For instance, the Nazis, who deemed 
themselves morally superior in various ways, may have been disgusted by the presence of 
those made to appear morally questionable (e.g., homosexuals, gypsies, people of Jewish 
faith; Nussbaum, 1998). In an attempt to maximize the distance between themselves and 
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morally questionable others, the Nazis removed their victims from society first by 
building walls around their living areas, then transferring them to concentration camps, 
and ultimately attempting to eliminate them.  The Nazis’ self-perceived moral virtue, in 
association with their intense efforts to depict their victims as morally and physically 
disgusting, is thought to have motivated these horrific actions (e.g., Taylor, 2007).   
To promote cooperation and community it would seem important to provide 
cleansing options (e.g., hand sanitizer readily available, showers at work) for people 
whose employment contains disgusting components, in particular for those professions 
that consist of significant interactions with others.  For example, nurses who clean up 
their patients’ bodily fluids, likely benefit from cleansing opportunities to prevent being 
overly punitive in their interactions with their ill patients or excessively judging of their 
co-workers’ mistakes.  Their exposure to such fluids may threaten their moral character 
and to restore this without condemning those deemed morally questionable, cleansing 
may be essential.  According to the MCM, volunteer work with the underprivileged may 
be associated with a lesser need for cleansing because the volunteers are not expected to 
experience a threat to their moral character due to their pro-social deeds.  Charities may 
want to remind their target audience of times they acted in morally questionable ways to 
evoke pro-social motivation and associated financial support in them.  Alternatively, they 
may want to offer their target audience a cleanliness experience, to lift their moral 
character to virtuous and spark an interest in continuing to demonstrate their moral virtue.   
 These implications illustrate that the influence of disgust in legal, ethical and 
social areas can be highly divisive and destructive, and that reducing and managing 
disgust may be crucial to ensure justice and humanity (e.g., Nussbaum, 1998).  However, 
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several scholars have argued that disgust can also be very informative and unique in its 
ability to draw attention to cruelty (e.g., Kahan, 1998). Indeed, Miller (1997) explained 
that disgust “marks out moral matters for which we can have no compromise” (pp. 194).  
Given this duality, lowering disgust may thus only be prudent in certain circumstances.  
For example, homosexuality is often associated with disgust and impurity (e.g., Inbar et 
al., 2009), and this disgust may influence how moral transgressions by homosexuals are 
judged, even when sexual orientation is irrelevant.  Experienced disgust may bias 
decisions and increase motivation to assign negative attributes to the actions of those who 
are different (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006). This may be the case if homosexual criminals 
are punished harsher than heterosexuals who committed the same crime, or if offenders 
of homosexual victims receive less punishment than those of heterosexual victims (e.g., 
Kahan, 1998; Uhrich, 1999). However, the disgust that motivates harsher judgments of a 
perpetrator who raped and tortured his victim prior to killing them, compared to a 
perpetrator who did not engage in such acts before killing his victim, may be informative.  
The disgust and moral outrage (Carlsmith, Carley, & Robinson, 2002) experienced in 
response to the first scenario indicates that it is significantly more cruel and repulsive, 
and perhaps deserving of more severe punishment.  Accordingly, eliminating such 
“wisdom of repugnance” (Kass, 1997) from moral judgments may be undesirable and in 
all likelihood practically impossible (e.g., Huang & Anderson, 2006).   
Rather than attempting to eliminate disgust from the judgments about the 
transgressions of others, it appears crucial to recognize its existence on the one hand and 
to manage it appropriately on the other hand.  By differentiating between disgust elicited 
by crimes versus disgust elicited by characteristics of criminals irrelevant to the crime 
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itself (e.g., facial malformation, sexual orientation, nationality, religious practices), and 
closely monitoring how the latter in particular may influence moral judgments, we may 
be better able to utilize the “wisdom” of disgust without letting it destroy our “humanity”.  
 
Conclusions 
The current research showed that disgust may only exert a unique influence – 
distinct from other negative affect – on moral judgments when judging purity violations.  
Cleanliness predicted more severe judgment of moral violations overall after controlling 
for the positivity associated with cleanliness.  These findings led to formulation of the 
MCM, which poses that both feelings of disgust and those of cleanliness can result in 
more severe moral judgments, albeit via different mechanisms (i.e., to avert threat to 
moral character or to continue to boost moral virtue, respectively). Future studies 
comparing how inferior or superior moral character as perceived by the self versus others 
influences cognitions and behavior would be highly informative in this regard.  The 
current findings suggest that development of paradigms that reduce attention to one’s 
moral character may be an important future research topic, to limit interference of 
personal motivational processes (i.e., seeming of good moral character) in judgment of 
other people when these are deemed inappropriate. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
MORAL VIOLATIONS STUDY ONE 
 
Non-morally Questionable Behaviors 
1. A.T. took a friend to the movies 
2. D.H. went to lunch with an acquaintance 
3. F.W. went for a walk in the park 
4. L.E. bought a new lawnmower 
 
Moderate Morally Questionable Behaviors 
1. N.D. parked in a handicapped spot 
2. T.R. neglected an elderly relative 
3. K.D. lied to a good friend 
4. Q.P. stole out of the collection plate at church 
 
Severe Morally Questionable Behaviors 
1. G.W. murdered 2 people in their own home 
2. J.Q. raped a social worker 
3. L.T. tortured someone with needles 
4. R.Y. beat a homeless person unconscious 
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APPENDIX B 
 
MORAL VIOLATIONS STUDY TWO AND THREE 
 
Non-purity Violations 
1. John lied to a good friend 
2. John spread unflattering rumors about a friend 
3. John lied about how many hours he worked 
4. John ran to knock someone off of a bike 
5. John intentionally gave someone wrong directions 
6. John cut up someone’s jacket 
7. John scratched someone’s car with a key 
8. John broke someone's window with a rock 
9. John sold a customer a known-to-be defective product 
10. John backed into someone’s car and didn’t leave a note 
 
Purity Violations 
1. John spit into someone’s drink 
2. John knowingly served someone food past its expiration date 
3. John forced someone to drink spoiled milk 
4. John pushed someone into a dumpster which was swarming with cockroaches 
5. John hazed members of his group by urinating on them 
6. John urinated on someone’s car door handle 
7. John threw someone’s cell phone into an unflushed toilet 
8. John rubbed someone's toothbrush on the floor of a public restroom 
9. John knowingly handled food at a restaurant immediately after using the 
bathroom 
10. John intentionally aimed his vomit onto an air filter at a friend’s house 
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APPENDIX C 
 
QUESTIONNAIRES STUDY ONE, TWO, AND THREE 
 
Disgust Scale – Revised (Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 1994, modified by Olatunji et 
al., 2007) 	  
1.  I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under some circumstances.  
2.  It would bother me to be in a science class, and to see a human hand preserved in 
a jar.  
3.  It bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full of mucous.  
4.  I never let any part of my body touch the toilet seat in public restrooms.  
5.  I would go out of my way to avoid walking through a graveyard.  
6.  Seeing a cockroach in someone else's house doesn't bother me.  
7.  It would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body.  
8.  If I see someone vomit, it makes me sick to my stomach.  
9.  I probably would not go to my favorite restaurant if I found out that the cook had 
a cold.  
10.  It would not upset me at all to watch a person with a glass eye take the eye out of 
the socket.   
11.  It would bother me to see a rat run across my path in a park.  
12.  I would rather eat a piece of fruit than a piece of paper  
13.  Even if I was hungry, I would not drink a bowl of my favorite soup if it had been 
stirred by a used but thoroughly washed flyswatter.  
14.  It would bother me to sleep in a nice hotel room if I knew that a man had died of a 
heart attack in that room the night before.  
 
Participants are asked to indicate to what extent they agree with these statements, or how 
true they are for them, on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree – very 
untrue about me) to 4 (strongly agree – very true about me). 
 
 
15.  You see maggots on a piece of meat in an outdoor garbage pail.  
16.  You see a person eating an apple with a knife and fork 
17.  While you are walking through a tunnel under a railroad track, you smell urine.  
18.  You take a sip of soda, and then realize that you drank from the glass that an 
acquaintance of yours had been drinking from.  
19.  Your friend's pet cat dies, and you have to pick up the dead body with your bare 
hands.   
20.  You see someone put ketchup on vanilla ice cream, and eat it.  
21.  You see a man with his intestines exposed after an accident.  
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22.  You discover that a friend of yours changes underwear only once a week.  
23.  A friend offers you a piece of chocolate shaped like dog-doo.  
24.  You accidentally touch the ashes of a person who has been cremated.  
25.  You are about to drink a glass of milk when you smell that it is spoiled.  
26.  As part of a sex education class, you are required to inflate a new unlubricated 
condom, using your mouth.  
27.  You are walking barefoot on concrete, and you step on an earthworm. 
 
Participants are asked to indicate how disgusting they would find each of these 
experiences on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (not disgusting at all) to 4 
(extremely disgusting). 
 
 
 
Negative Affect Scale of the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
1. distressed 
2. upset 
3. guilty 
4. scared 
5. hostile 
6. irritable 
7. ashamed 
8. nervous 
9. jittery 
10. afraid 
 
Participants are asked to indicate to what extent they typically feel each emotion on a 5-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very slightly/not at all) to 5 (extremely). 
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  i	  To identify non-purity and purity violations that are moderate in severity, 20 
undergraduate participants (67% female, 78% Caucasian) were asked to rate 56 moral 
transgressions (28 representing impurity, 28 not representing impurity), in terms of 
immorality, disgust and punishment on an 8-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all morally 
wrong / disgusting / deserving of punishment) to 7 (extremely morally wrong / disgusting 
/ deserving of punishment). Transgressions in the purity and non-purity category were 
matched in terms of proportion of violations occurring toward a person (70%) or property 
(30%), and were all described as intentional (as opposed to accidental). Word count of 
non-purity transgressions was matched to that of purity transgressions. Purity (M = 4.60, 
SD = 1.44) and non-purity violations (M = 4.63, SD = .89) were rated as equally morally 
wrong, F(1,18) = .02, n.s., and purity violations (M = 5.89, SD = .86) were considered 
significantly more disgusting than non-purity violations (M = 3.73, SD = 1.17), F(1, 18) = 
56.26, p < .001. Finally, purity violations (M = 4.11, SD = 1.38) and non-purity violations 
(M = 4.01, SD = .99) were considered equally deserving of punishment, F(1, 18) = .28, 
n.s.  ii	  To identify a disgust induction paradigm that elicited disgust with the same intensity as 
the ice water induction paradigm elicited discomfort, a pilot study was conducted where 
15 participants (78% female, 67% Caucasian) placed their left hand, without a glove, in 
50-degree ice water, 80-degree lukewarm water, room temperature imitation vomit, room 
temperature “real” pig intestines and room temperature “fake” pig intestines, and rated 
disgust and discomfort of each of these textures on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely). Both types of intestines consisted of sausage casing stuffed with a mixture of 
mashed potatoes, gravy and red dye. They differed from one another only by the color 
and density of the stuffing, and one was labelled “real” while the other was identified as 
“fake”. The textures were presented in random order and were rated twice by each 
participant, to account for order and comparison effects, and to measure habituation that 
may occur due to repeated exposure.  There was a significant rating (disgust, discomfort) 
X liquid (lukewarm water, ice water, fake intestines, real intestines, imitation vomit) 
interaction F(4, 56) = 24.54, p < .001. Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs 
demonstrated a main effect of texture for disgust ratings, F(4, 56) = 112.81, p < .001 as 
well as discomfort ratings F(4, 56) = 49.57, p < .001. The primary aim of this pilot study 
was to identify emotion-induction paradigms that differed in terms of induced disgust, 
but not in terms of induced discomfort, and that induced disgust with the same intensity 
as ice water did discomfort.  Pairwise comparisons showed that imitation vomit induced 
significantly more disgust (M = 5.07, SD = 1.29) than did ice water (M = .40, SD = .54, p 
< .001), while imitation vomit (M = 4.47, SD = 1.14) and ice water (M = 4.57, SD = 1.43, 
n.s.) elicited equal levels of discomfort, indicating the suited nature of these paradigms.  
In addition, exposure to lukewarm water elicited no disgust (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00) or 
discomfort (M = 0.00, SD = 0.00), motivating the use of lukewarm water in the neutral 
condition.   	  iii	  These emotion induction procedures were selected on the basis of a pilot study 
designed to identify a cleanliness induction that induced greater levels of cleanliness than 
a positive affect induction, but similar levels of positivity.  Participants (N = 13, 62 % 
female, 77 % Caucasian) evaluated 110-degree soapy water, 90-degree soapy water, 
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unheated soft fabric, and heated soft fabric in terms of positivity, cleanliness, and 
intensity on a scale from 0 (not at all positive / clean / intense) to 7 (extremely positive / 
clean / intense).  The textures were presented in random order and were rated twice by 
each participant.  Analysis revealed a significant rating (cleanliness, positivity, intensity) 
by texture (unheated soft fabric, heated soft fabric, 90-degree soapy water, 110-degree 
soapy water) interaction, F(6, 72) = 6.45, p < .001. Follow-up repeated measure analyses 
showed no main effect of texture for positivity ratings, F(3, 36) = 1.98, n.s., indicating 
that participants found 110-degree soapy water (M = 4.85, SD = 1.46), 90-degree soapy 
water (M = 3.46, SD = 1.27), unheated soft fabric (M = 4.23, SD = 2.09), and heated soft 
fabric (M = 3.69, SD = 2.32) equally positive. The heated soft fabric and 90-degree soapy 
water were most similar in positivity (Mean difference = .23).  Follow-up repeated 
measure analyses did reveal a significant main effect of texture for cleanliness ratings, 
F(3, 36) = 18.95, p < .001, and pairwise comparisons indicated that participants rated 
110-degree soapy water more clean (M = 5.77, SD = .93) than 90-degree soapy water (M 
= 4.77, SD = 1.09, p = .003), unheated soft fabric (M = 3.54, SD = 1.51, p < .001), and 
heated soft fabric (M = 2.46, SD = 1.76, p < .001).  The 90-degree soapy water was rated 
as significantly cleaner than the heated soft fabric (p < .001).  Finally, there was no main 
effect of texture for intensity ratings, F(3, 36) = 2.13, n.s., suggesting that exposure to all 
four textures was rated as equally intense.  Because the (non-significant) difference in 
positivity was the smallest between heated soft fabric and 90-degree soapy water, and 90-
degree soapy water was rated as significantly more clean than heated soft fabric (which, 
in fact, was rated as least clean texture of all four), 90-degree soapy water was selected 
for the cleanliness condition and heated soft fabric for the positivity condition.  
 	  
